| | |
| P. Vajravelu Mudaliar
vs Special Deputy
Collector, Madras
Equivalent citations:
1965 AIR 1017, 1965
SCR (1) 614 | The fact that Parliament used the same expressions, namely, "compensation" and "principles" as were found in Art. 31 before the Amendment is a clear indication that it
accepted the meaning given by this Court to those expressions in Mrs. Bela Banerjee's case(1).
Hon’ble Apex Court further observed that in Craies on Statute Law, 6th Edn., at p. 167, the relevant principle of construction is stated thus:
“There is a well-known principle of construction, ‘that where the legislature used in an Act a legal term which has received judicial interpretation, it must be assumed that
the term is used in the sense in which it has been judicially interpreted unless a contrary intention appears.”
The said two expressions in Art. 31 (2), before the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, have received an authoritative interpretation by the highest court in
the land and it must be presume that Parliament did not intend to depart from the meaning given by this Court to the said expressions |
| Banarasi Devi vs
Income-Tax Officer,
Calcutta 1964 AIR 1742 | The relevant rule of construction is clearly stated by Viscount Buckmaster in Barras v. Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Fishing Co. Ltd.(2) thus:
"It has long been a well established principle to be applied in the consideration of Act of Parliament that where a word of doubtful meaning has received a
clear judicial interpretation the subsequent statute which incorporates the same word or the same phrase in a similar context, must be construed so that the
word or phrase is interpreted according to the meaning that has previously assigned to it." |
| M/S. Bangalore Club
vs The Commissioner
Of Wealth Tax on 8
September, 2020 | It is well-settled that when Parliament used the expression “association of persons” in Section 21AA of the Wealth Tax Act, it must be presumed to know that this
expression had been the subject matter of comment in a cognate allied legislation, namely, the Income Tax Act, as referring to persons banding together for a common
purpose, being a business purpose in the context of a taxation statute in order to earn income or profits. This presumption is felicitously referred to in the following
judgments. |
| Shree Bhagwati Steel
Rolling Mills v.
CCE (2016) 3 SCC 643, | It is settled law that Parliament is presumed to know the law when it enacts a particular piece of legislation. The Prevention of Corruption Act was passed in the year
1988, that is long after 1969 when the Constitution Bench decision in Rayala Corpn. [Rayala Corpn. (P) Ltd. v. Director of Enforcement, (1969) 2 SCC 412] had
been delivered. It is, therefore, presumed that Parliament enacted Section 31 knowing that the decision in Rayala Corpn. [Rayala Corpn. (P) Ltd. v. Director of
Enforcement, (1969) 2 SCC 412] had stated that an omission would not amount to a repeal and it is for this reason that Section 31 was enacted. This again
does not take us further as this statement of the law in Rayala Corpn. [Rayala Corpn. (P) Ltd. v. Director of Enforcement, (1969) 2 SCC 412] is no longer the law declared
by the Supreme Court after the decision in Fibre Board case [Fibre Boards (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (2015) 10 SCC 333]. This reason therefore again cannot avail the appellant. |
| Sakal Deep Sahai
Srivastava vs Union Of
India & Anr 1974 AIR
338, 1974 SCR (2) 485 | But, our difficulty is that the question appears to us to be no longer open for consideration afresh by us, or, at any rate, it is not advisable to review the authorities of this
Court, after such a lapse of time when, despite the view taken by this Court that Article 102 of the Limitation Act of 1908 was applicable to such cases, the Limitation
Act of 1963 had been passed repeating the law, contained in Articles 102 and 120 of the Limitation Act of 1908, in identical terms without any modification. The Legislature
must be presumed to be cognizant of the view of, this Court that a claim of the nature before us, for arrears of salary, falls within the purview of Article 102 of
the Limitation Act of 1908. If Parliament, which is deemed to be aware of the declaration of law by this Court, did not alter the law, it must be deemed to have
accepted the interpretation of this Court even though the correctness of it may be open to doubt. If doubts had arisen, it was for the Legislature to clear these
doubts. When the Legislature has not done so, despite the repeal of the Limitation Act of 1908, and the enactment of the Limitation Act of 1963 after the
decisions of this Court, embodying a possible questionable view, we think it is expedient and proper to over-rule the submission made on behalf of the
appellant that the correctness of the view adopted by this Court in its decisions on the question so far should be re-examined by a larger Bench |
| The Panchayat Board.
vs The Western India
Matches Company
(1939) 1 MLJ 588 (Mad) | Viscount Buckmaster went on to quote the words of James, L.J., in Ex parte Campbell (1870) 5 Ch. 703, where he observed:
Where once certain words in an Act of Parliament have received a judicial construction in one of the superior Courts, and the Legislature has repeated them
without alteration in a subsequent statute, I conceive that the Legislature must be taken to have used them according to the meaning which a Court of
competent jurisdiction has given to them |
