The Court observed that Section 16(2) does not appear to be a provision which allows input tax credit, rather ITC enabling provision is section 16(1). On the
other hand, section 16(2) restricts the credit which was otherwise allowed to only such cases where conditions prescribed in it were satisfied. Therefore, section
16(2) in terms only override the provision which enabled the ITC i.e., section 16(1). This is evident from the manner in which Section 16(2) is couched. The non
obstante clause in section 16(2) is followed by a negative sentence "no registered person shall be entitled to the credit of any input tax in respect of any supply
of goods or services or both to him unless". This negative sentence pellucidly tells that unless the conditions mentioned in section 16(2) are satisfied, no credit
will be eligible. This stipulation manifests that section 16(2) is not an enabling provision but a restricting provision. What it restricts is the eligibility which was
otherwise given U/s 16(1). Hence unless such clear inconsistency is established, overriding effect cannot be given over other provisions. In the present case
both Section 16(2) and (4) are two different restricting provisions, the former providing eligibility conditions and the later imposing time limit. Further, influence
of a non obstante clause has to be considered on the basis of the context also in which it is used. Therefore, section 16(4) being a non-contradictory provision
and capable of clear interpretation, will not be overridden by non obstante provision u/s 16(2). Thus, in substance it was held that section 16(1) is an enabling
clause for ITC; 16(2) subjects such entitlement to certain conditions; section 16(3) and (4) further restrict the entitlement given u/s 16(1). That being the scheme
of the provision, it is out of context to contend that one of the restricting provisions overrides other two restrictions. Another way of looking it was that if really
legislature had no intention to impose time limit, there was no necessity to insert Section16(4) and to further intend to override it through section 16(2).
The Court further observed that mere filing of the return with a delay fee will not act as a springboard for claiming ITC and referred to the argument by learned
Advocate General wherein it was stated that collection of late fee is only for the purpose of admitting the returns for verification of taxable turnover of the
petitioner but not for consideration of ITC. Such a statutory limitation cannot be stifled by collecting late fee.
The Court observed that ITC being a concession, the legislature is within its competency to impose certain conditions, including time prescription for availing
such right. Thus, time limit prescribed for claiming ITC u/s 16(4) is not violative of articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 300-A of the Constitution of India