1. Use of Definition Clause-Nahalchand Laloochand P.Ltd vs Panchali Co-Op.Hng.Sty.Ltd on 31 August, 2010
“Justice G.P. Singh in the `Principles of Statutory Interpretation’ (12th edition, 2010) says that the object of a definition of a term is to avoid the necessity of frequent repetitions in describing all the subject matter to which that word or expression so defined is intended to apply. In other words, the definition clause is inserted for the purpose of defining particular subject-matter dealt with and it helps in revealing the legislative meaning. However, the definitive clause may itself require interpretation because of ambiguity or lack of clarity in its language. In the `Construction of Statutes’ by Earl T. Crawford (1989 reprint) at page 362, the following statement is made: “…….the interpretation clause will control in the absence of anything else in the act opposing the interpretation fixed by the clause. Nor should the interpretation clause be given any wider meaning than is absolutely necessary. In other words, it should be subjected to a strict construction.”
2. Meaning of the term defined under the Act would not vary across statute-Bhagwati Developers Pvt. Ltd vs Peerless Gen.Finance … on 15 July, 2013
When the word ‘Securities’ has been defined under the Regulation Act, its meaning would not vary when the same word is used at more than one place in the same Statute, otherwise it will defeat the very object of the definition Section.
3. Meaning of the Word not defined in the Statue-Maheshwari Fish Seed Farm vs T. Nadu Electricity Board And Anr on 16 April, 2004
It is settled rule of interpretation that the words not defined in a statute are to be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense. According to Justice Frankfurter, “After all, legislation, when not expressed in technical terms, is addressed to common run of men, and is, therefore, to be understood according to sense of the thing, as the ordinary man has a right to rely on ordinary words addressed.” (Wilma E. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, 322 US 607, at p.618). In determining, therefore, whether a particular import is included within the ordinary meaning of a given word, one may have regard to the answer which everyone conversant with the word and the subject-matter of statute and to whom the legislation is addressed, will give if the problem were put to him. (Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, Ninth Edition, 2004, p.95
4. Perils of Importing definition of from statute-Maheshwari Fish Seed Farm vs T. Nadu Electricity Board And Anr on 16 April, 2004
Suffice it to observe that the common parlance meaning of the term ‘agriculture’, in the context in which it has been used and is arising for determination before us, cannot be determined by reference to definition given in other statutes. This we say for more reasons than one. Firstly, none of the statutes reffered to by Shri Iyer, the learned senior counsel, can be called statutes in pari materia. Secondly, it is common knowledge that the definition coined by the Legislature for the purpose of a particular enactment is often an extended or artificial meaning so assigned as to fulfill the object of that enactment. Such definitions given in other enactments cannot be freely used for finding out meaning to be assigned to a term of common parlance used in an altogether different setting. And lastly, as Justice G.P. Singh points out in “Principles of Statutory Interpretation” (Ninth Edition, 2004, at page 163) “……it is hazardous to interpret a statute in accordance with a definition in another statute and more so when such statute is not dealing with any cognate subject or the statutes are not in pari materia.” The same view has been taken in the decision of this court in CIT, W.B. v. Benoy Kumar (supra) which we have extensively referred to earlier in this judgment.
5. Perils of Dictionary Meaning-CGT vs. Getti Chettiar [ 1971] 82 ITR 599(SC)
A reading of this section clearly goes to show that the words “disposition”, “conveyance”, “assignment”, “settlement”, “delivery” and “payment” are used as some of the modes of transfer of property. The dictionary gives various meanings for those words but those meanings do not help us. We have to understand the meaning of those words in the context in which they are used. Words in a section of a statute are not to be interpreted by having those words in one hand and the dictionary in the other. In spelling out the meaning of the words in a section, one must take into consideration the setting in which those terms are used and the purpose that they are intended to serve.
6. Definition of word from other statue no to be imported if not pari materia-Sri Jagatram Ahuja vs The Commissioner Of Gift Tax on 17 October, 2000
We may state here itself that the words and expressions defined in one statute as judicially interpreted do not afford a guide to construction of the same words or expressions in another statute unless both the statutes are para-materia legislations or it is specifically so provided in one statute to give the same meaning to the words as defined in other statute. The aim and object of the two legislations, namely, the Gift-tax Act and the Estate Duty Act are not similar.
7. Meaning of a word to be taken in the context of statute-M/S. Msco. Pvt. Ltd vs Union Of India & Ors on 31 October, 1984
But while construing a word which occurs in a statute or a statutory instrument in the absence of any definition in that very document it must be given the same meaning which it receives in ordinary parlance or understood in the sense in which people conversant with the subject matter of the statute or statutory instrument understand it. It is hazardous to interpret a word in accordance with its definition in another statute or statutory instrument and more so when such statute or statutory instrument is not dealing with any cognate subject. Craies on Statute Law (6th Edn.) says thus and page 164:
“In construing a word in an Act caution is necessary in adopting the meaning ascribed to the word in other Acts. “It would be a new terror in the construction of Acts of Parliament if we were required to limit a word to an unnatural sense because in some Act which is not incorporated or referred to such an interpretation is given to it for the purposes of that Act alone.” Macbeth v. Chislett  A.C. 220, 223.”
When the word to be construed is used in a taxing statute or a notification issued thereunder it should be understood in its commercial sense. It is well known that under the law levying customs duties sometimes exemptions are given from the levy of the whole or a part of customs duty when the goods in question are sold either in the form in which they are received or in a manufactured or semi manufactured state to a manufacturing establishment for purposes of using them in manufacturing finished or semi- finished goods in order to lessen the cost of machinery or equipment employed in or raw materials used by such manufacturing establishment. The object of granting such exemption is to give encouragement to factories or establishments which carry on manufacturing business. The appellant, however, relies upon the meaning assigned to the word ‘industry’ in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in support of its case. The expression ‘industry’ is no doubt given a very wide definition in section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It reads thus:
“2 (j) ‘industry’ means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen.”
The above definition is given in the context of the subject matter with which the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is concerned. The pith and substance of that act is to make provision for settlement of disputes between employers and employees in institutions, establishments, industrial or business houses or factories of various kinds. It is true that in the Bangalore Water- Supply and Sewerage Board, etc. v. R. Rajappa & Ors. this Court has hold that hospitals would also come within the definition of the expression ‘industry’ given in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which is as wide as the legislature could have possibly made it. But that definition cannot be used for interpreting the word ‘industry’ in a notification granting exemption from customs duty under the Customs Act, 1962.