Relevance of Illustration- Mahomed Shedol Ariffin v. Yeoh Ooi Gark (1)- Mahomed Syedol Ariffin vs Yeoh Ooi Gark on 20 July, 1916 Equivalent citations: (1917) 19 BOMLR 157
“It is the duty of a court of law to accept, if that can be done, the illustrations given as being both of relevance and value in the construction of the text. The illustrations should in no case be rejected because they do not square with ideas possibly derived from an other system of jurisprudence as to the law with which they are the sections deal And it would require a very special case to warrant their rejection on the ground of their assumed repugnancy to the sections themselves. It would be the very last resort of construction to make any such assumption. The great usefulness of the illustrations, which have, although no part of the sections, been expressly furnished by the Legislature as helpful in the working and application of the statute, should not be thus impaired.”
Illustration cannot modify language of Section-Shambhu Nath Mehra Vs. The State of Ajmer [AIR 1956 SC 404]
“13. We recognise that an illustration does not exhaust the full content of the section which it illustrate but equally it can neither curtail nor expand its ambit; and if knowledge of certain facts is as much available to the prosecution, should it choose exercise due diligence, as to the accused, the facts cannot be said to be especially” within the knowledge of the accused.
Words of the Section prevails over Illustration– Aniruddha Mitra vs Administrator General Bengal on 5 April, 1949 Equivalent citations: (1949) 51 BOMLR 971
It is well settled that just as illustrations should not be read as extending the meaning of a section, they should also not be read as restricting its operation, especially so, when the effect would be to curtail a right which the plain words of the section would confer.
Meaning of Erroneous-M/S. The Malabar Industrial Co. vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax, … on 10 February, 2000
An incorrect assumption of facts or an incorrect application of law will satisfy the requirement of the order being erroneous. In the same category fall orders passed without applying the principles of natural justice or without application of mind. when an Income-tax Officer adopted one of the courses permissible in law and it has resulted in loss of revenue; or where two views are possible and the Income-tax Officer has taken one view with which the Commissioner does not agree, it cannot be treated as an erroneous order prejudicial to the interests of the revenue unless the view taken by the Income-tax Officer is unsustainable in law.
Delegated Legislation and Power to Make Rules under the Act- Agricultural Market Committee vs Shalimar Chemical Works Ltd on 7 May, 1997
23. The reasons for giving delegated power to the Government to make Rules are many, but the most prominent and dominant reasons are:
(i) The area for which powers are given to make delegated legislation may be technically complex, so much so, that it may not be possible and may even be difficult to set out all the permutations in the Statute.
(ii) The Executive may require time to experiment and to find out how the original legislation was operating and thereafter to fill up all other details.
(iii) It gives an advantage to the Executive, in the sense that a Government with an onerous legislative time schedule may feel tempted to pass skeleton legislation with the details being provided by the making of Rules and Regulations.
24. The power of delegation is a constituent element of the legislative power as a whole under Article 245 of the Constitution and other relative Articles and when the Legislatures enact laws to meet the challenge of the complex socio-economic problems, they often find it convenient and neces- sary to delegate subsidiary or ancillary powers to delegates of their choice for carrying out the policy laid down by the Acts as part of the Administra-tive Law.
26. The principle which, therefore, emerges out is that the essential legislative function consists of the determination of the legislative policy and the Legislature cannot abdicate essential legislative function in favour of another. Power to make subsidiary legislation may be entrusted by the Legislature to another body of its choice but the Legislature should, before delegating, enunciate either expressly or by implication, the policy and the principles for the guidance of the delegates. These principles also apply to Taxing Statutes. The effect of these principles is that the delegate which has been authorised to make subsidiary Rules and Regulations has to work within the scope of its authority and cannot widen or constrict the scope of the Act or the policy laid down thereunder. It cannot, in the garb of making Rules, legislate on the field covered by the Act and has to restrict itself to the mode of implementation of the policy and purpose of the Act. #LEARNINGTHELAW-7-BRIEF COMPILATION OF JUDGEMENT ON USE OF INTERPRETATION OF BRACKETED PORTION IN STATUE; WIDE MEANING OF DEFINITION MAY BE RESTRICTED TO BRING IT INLINE WITH THE CONTEXT OF THE STATUTE; ALL DEFINITIONS IN STATUTES GENERALLY BEGIN WITH QUALIFYING WORDS, “UNLESS THERE IS ANYTHING REPUGNANT IN THE SUBJECT OR CONTEXT”; EVEN THE WORD “MEANS” IN DEFINITION CLAUSE WOULD BE SUBJECT TO UNLESS THERE IS ANYTHING REPUGNANT IN THE SUBJECT OR CONTEXT used in the Act would mean a person or body corporate actually carrying on the business of insurance it may be that in certain sections the word may have a somewhat different meaning. A perusal of a few sections of the Act will illustrate this and immediately show that the word ” insurer ” has been used in some sections to mean not merely a person actually carrying on the business of insurance but also a person who intends to carry on the business of insurance but has not actually started it and also a person who was carrying on the business of insurance but has ceased to do so. Even the Word “means” in Definition Clause would be subject to unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context- National Insurance Co.Ltd. & Anr vs Kirpal Singh (SC) We are mindful of the fact that the word ‘means’ used in statutory definitions generally implies that the definition is exhaustive. But that general rule of interpretation is not without an exception. An equally well-settled principle of interpretation is that the use of the word ‘means’ in a statutory definition notwithstanding the context in which the expression is defined cannot be ignored in any forensic exercise meant to discover the real purport of an expression. Referred Judgements Lord Denning’s observations in Hotel and Catering Industry Training Board v. Automobile Proprietary Ltd. (1968) 1 W.L.R. 1526 are, in this regard, apposite when he said: “It is true that ‘the industry’ is defined; but a definition is not to be read in isolation. It must be read in the context of the phrase which it defines, realising that the function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to a word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain-but not to contradict it or supplant it altogether” The Vanguard Fire & General Insurance Co. Ltd. Madras v. Fraser & Ross & Anr. AIR 1960 SC 971-Statutory definitions or abbreviations must be read subject to the qualification variously expressed in the definition clauses which created them and it may be that even where the definition is exhaustive inasmuch as the word defined is said to mean a certain thing, it is possible for the word to have a somewhat different meaning in different sections of the Act depending upon the subject or the context. That is why all definitions in statutes generally begin with the qualifying words “unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context”. Paul Enterprises & Ors. v. Rajib Chatterjee and Co. & Ors. (2009) 3 SCC 709- Interpretation clause should be given a contextual meaning and that all statutory definitions must be read subject to the qualification variously expressed in the interpretation clause, which created them. State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. B.E. Billimoria & Ors. (2003) 7 SCC 336-Meaning of an expression must be determined in the context in which the same has been used. By CA Dr. Arpit Haldia Page: 5 Email: firstname.lastname@example.org K.V. Muthu v. Angamuthu Ammal (1997) 2 SCC 53-Apparently, it appears that the definition is conclusive as the word “means” has been used to specify the members, namely, spouse, son, daughter, grand-child or dependent parent, who would constitute the family. Section 2 of the Act in which various terms have been defined, open with the words “in this Act, unless the context otherwise requires” which indicates that the definitions, as for example, that of “Family”, which are indicated to be conclusive may not be treated to be conclusive if it was otherwise required by the context. This implies that a definition, like any other word in a statute, has to be read in the light of the context and scheme of the Act as also the object for which the Act was made by the Legislature