Part-93-Snapshot to Cases on Legal Maxims

-“Lex reprobate moram”- The law dislikes delay
-“Lex in justa non est”- An unjust law is no law at all
-“Discretio est discemere per legen quid sit justum”- Discretion consists in knowing what is just in law.
-“Actus curiae neminem gravabit”- Act of Court shall prejudice no one and Court is under an obligation to undo the wrong done to a party by act of Court
-“Sublato fundamento cadit opus”- In case of foundation is removed, the superstructure falls.

93.-Daily-Round-up-to-the-Latest-CasesDownload

S.No

Case

Held

1

Commissioner
of Central
Excise, Pune
v. Shruti
Colorants Ltd.
[2008] 17 STT
129 (BOM.)

Legal Maxim-“lex reprobate moram”-The law dislikes delay
Held-Limitation, even in common parlance, has been explained as the act of limitation, the state of being limited - a restriction and a statutory period - after which a law suit or
prosecution cannot be brought in the Court of Law. No system of administration of justice permits or grants delay as a matter of right. On the contrary, maxim lex reprobate moram is
the precept to governance of law. The provisions under the general or a special statute which provides for act and occasions to be taken with a specified period are based upon
the maxim omnes actions in mundo infra cetra tempora habent limititationem. The limitation, particularly in special statute is subjected to reasonable or strict construction as bar of
limitation causes hardship as delays in law are odious. The period of limitation once starts from terminus a qua, it does not stop, may be the party in default, is entitled to exclusion
or condonation if specifically so contemplated under the provisions of the relevant law. It is expected of every litigant to be vigilant and mindful of his right as time runs against the
indolent and those who are not mindful of their rights. Another point of view which supports strict interpretation of law of limitation is that the remedy and relief both could be declined
on the ground of laches, that is, where a party could invoke the remedy but there is unreasonable delay in pursuing the right of claim, the course of equity even there the Court
would decline to grant a relief to the applicant. This sufficiently indicates enforcement of law of limitation with all its vigour except for the exceptions carved out in the provision itself.
This principle squarely applies with greater impact upon the special legislations providing a special period for remedies available under that statute.

2

Bharat
Petroleum
Corpn. Ltd. v.
Maddula
Ratnavali [2007]
6 SCC 81

Legal Maxim-“Lex in justa non est”- An unjust law is no law at all
Held-The Court although not being oblivious of the legal principle that only because a statute causes hardship, the same may not be declared ultra vires. (Dura Lex Sed Lex) also
referred to the principle that a statute, however, must be construed justly. An unjust law is no law at all (Lex injusta non est lex). Decision in the matter of Kailash Chand & Anr.
v. Dharam Dass [(2005) 5 SCC 375], was referred wherein it was opined that the legislature is incapable of contemplating all possible situations which may arise in future litigation
and in myriad circumstances. The scope is always there for the court to interpret the law with pragmatism and consistently with the demands of varying situations. The construction
placed by the court on statutory provisions has to be meaningful. The legislative intent has to be found out and effectuated. Though law and justice are not synonymous terms they
have a close relationship, as pointed out by the American jurist Rawls. Since one of the aims of the law is to provide order and peace in society, and since order and peace cannot
last long if it is based on injustice, it follows that a legal system that cannot meet the demands of justice will not survive long. As Rawls says: Laws and institutions no matter how
efficient and well arranged, must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust. (ibid., p. 72.) Clearly, law cannot be so interpreted as would cause oppression or be unjust

3

Vijay Power
Generators Ltd.
v. Commissioner
of Sales Tax
[2000] 2000
taxmann.com
1982 (Delhi)

Legal Maxim- “Discretio est discemere per legen quid sit justum"-Discretion consists in knowing what is just in law.
Held- The Court observed that Prescribed Authority was conferred with discretion to dispense with pre-deposit conditionally or in full or in part. Such discretion was governed by
a maxim "Discretio est discemere per legen quid sit justum" (Discretion consists in knowing what is just in law). The Court also observed that discretion in general is the
discernment of what is right and proper. It denotes knowledge and prudence, that discernment which enables a person to judge critically of what is correct and proper united with
caution, to discern between falsity and truth, between shadow and substance, between equity and colourable glosses and pretences and not to do according to the will and private
affections or ill-will. It has to be done according to the rules of reasons and justice, not according to private opinion. It has to be done according to law and not humour. It is not be
arbitrary vague and fanciful but legal and regular. In the case at hand the Authorities made all elaborate analysis of factual stands of petitioner to the extent desirable while dealing
with an application for stay. It suffers from no inherent fallibility to warrant interference

4

Calcutta Jute
Manufacturing
Co. v.
Commercial Tax
Officer [1998]
1998
taxmann.com
1652 (SC)

Legal Maxim-“actus curiae neminem gravabit”- Act of Court shall prejudice no one and Court is under an obligation to undo the wrong done to a party by act of Court
Held-The Court observed that the tax amount which appellant should have paid as per section 6-B remained with the them during the entire period and they would have earned
good profit with that amount. The State, to which the tax amount should necessarily have gone, was not able to utilize it for public purposes, when appellants had the advantage of
keeping the amount of tax without paying it to the State exchequer only because the High Court granted orders restraining the State from recovering that amount from the assessee,
no act of the Court shall cause prejudice to any party. The prestine doctrine couched in the maxim "actus curiae neminem gravabit" has ever remained a salutary and guiding
principle. Thus, the contention that as the Courts granted injunction restraining the State from recovering the tax amount as per section 6B would raise a presumption that the Court
was then satisfied of the bona fides of the contention is too fragile for depriving the state of the statutory right of interest incorporated in Section 10-A of the Act. Merely because the
court granted interim orders it cannot be inferred that Court was then satisfied of a strong prima facie case for the appellants.

5

Gujarat Paraffins
(P.) Ltd. v. UOI
[2012] 22
taxmann.com 92
(Guj.)

Legal Maxim-“Sublato fundamento cadit opus”-in case of foundation is removed, the superstructure falls.
Held- It is a settled legal proposition that if initial action is not in consonance with law, subsequent proceedings would not sanctify the same. In such a fact situation, the
legal maximsublato fundamento cadit opus is applicable, meaning thereby, in case of foundation is removed, the superstructure falls. Similar principle of law, in our opinion, can
be extended in the present case too.

Part-92-Snapshot to Cases on Legal Maxims

-“Lex non curat de minimis”-Law does not care for trifles
-“Lex prospicit non respicit”-Law looks forward not backward
-“Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex”-Reason is the soul of the law, and when the reason of any particular law ceases, so does the law itself.
-“Dura lex sed led”- Law is hard, but it is the law

92.-Daily-Round-up-to-the-Latest-CasesDownload

S.No

Case

Held

1

Banian & Berry
Bearing (P.)
Ltd. v. Union of
India [2002]
2002
taxmann.com
557 (Gujarat)

Legal Maxim-"Lex non curat de minimis"-the Law does not care for trifles/Courts will not intervene in disputes where the substance of the controversy is insignificant.
Held-SCN was issued on the ground that the outstanding amount paid beyond due dates should have been paid through the PLA (Personal Ledger Account) and was not permitted
to be paid through CENVAT account in view of the provisions of erstwhile Rule 57AB. Para 8 of the Additional Commissioner's order dated 28.5.2002 explains that no prejudice was
caused to the revenue on account of the delay which was for a very short period. The said para reads as under:-
"8. An illustration would be sufficient to explain the above proviso. Suppose an assessee has to pay a duty of Rs. 1,00,000/- for the period 01.01.2000 to 15.01.2000 but he had only
Rs. 80,000/- in balance in his Cenvat account on 15.01.2000. He brings in fresh inputs on 18.01.2000 which involve a Cenvat credit of Rs.50,000/-. As on 20.01.2000, he has a
balance of Rs. 1,30,000/- in his Cenvat account while has to pay duty of Rs. 1,00,000/- only. It is in such a situation only that the said proviso comes into play. Now, according to the
said proviso, the Cenvat credit by the assessee can be utilized only to the extent which was available on 15.01.2000 i.e. Rs. 80,000/-. Therefore, the amount of Rs. 20,000/- will
remain outstanding for the said fortnight, and the same will have to be paid along with interest interms of relevant portion of Rule 49 reproduced earlier in this order. There is no bar
anywhere for payment of this outstanding amount from the credit of Rs. 50,000/- which has been earned later provided the due interest is also paid. It would be absurd to suggest that
Cenvat account cannot be utilized for payment of arrears of outstanding duties. The interest on duty in terms of Rule 49 partakes the character of duty and hence it to can be paid
from the Cenvat credit without any separate account."
The High Court held that considering the fact that in para 8 of the order dated 28.5.2002 the Additional Commissioner has already explained the provision of the Rule and looking to
the extent of the delay and the principle of "Lex non curat de minimis" (the Law does not care for trifles), the Additional Commissioner was justified in discharging the notice and
in this view of the matter, the Deputy Commissioner, Central Excise also ought not to have issued the order dated 3.7.2002 especially when the delay was very marginal and the
duties were already paid by the petitioners with 24% interest

2

CIT v. Vatika
Township (P.)
Ltd. [2015] 1
SCC 1 (SC)

Legal Maxim- “lex prospicit non respicit”-law looks forward not backward
Held-The Court observed that of the various rules guiding how a legislation has to be interpreted, one established rule is that unless a contrary intention appears, a legislation is
presumed not to be intended to have a retrospective operation. The idea behind the rule is that a current law should govern current activities. Law passed today cannot apply to the
events of the past. If we do something today, we do it keeping in view the law of today and in force and not tomorrow's backward adjustment of it. Our belief in the nature of the law
is founded on the bedrock that every human being is entitled to arrange his affairs by relying on the existing law and should not find that his plans have been retrospectively upset.
This principle of law is known as lex prospicit non respicit: law looks forward not backward. As was observed in Phillips vs. Eyre[3], a retrospective legislation is contrary to
the general principle that legislation by which the conduct of mankind is to be regulated when introduced for the first time to deal with future acts ought not to change the character of
past transactions carried on upon the faith of the then existing law. The Court further observed that the obvious basis of the principle against retrospectivity is the principle of "fairness",
which must be the basis of every legal rule as was observed in L'Office Cherifien des Phosphates v. Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd. Thus, legislations which modified
accrued rights or which impose obligations or impose new duties or attach a new disability have to be treated as prospective unless the legislative intent is clearly to give the enactment
a retrospective effect; unless the legislation is for purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former legislation or to explain a former legislation

3

Kranti
Associates (P.)
Ltd. v. Masood
Ahmed
Khan [2010] 9
SCC 496 (SC)

Legal Maxim- "Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex."-Reason is the soul of the law, and when the reason of any particular law ceases, so does the law itself.
Held-The Court while discussing that Reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion as it introduces clarity in an order and without the same it becomes lifeless referred to the decision
of Constitution Bench in H.H. Shri Swamiji of Shri Amar Mutt v. Commr., Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Deptt. [[1979] 4 SCC 642]. In the decision, while giving the
majority judgment Y.V. Chandrachud, CJ. referred to (SCC p. 658, para 29) Broom's Legal Maxims (1939 Edn., p. 97) where the principle in Latin runs as follows: "Cessante ratione
legis cessat ipsa lex." The English version of the said principle given by the Chief Justice is that: (H.H. Shri Swamiji case,SCC p. 658, para 29) "29. ... reason is the soul of the law,
and when the reason of any particular law ceases, so does the law itself." (See AIR p. 11, para 29.)

4

Oriental
Carbon &
Chemicals Ltd.
v. State of U.P.
[2011] 10
taxmann.com
357
(Allahabad)

Legal Maxim- “Dura lex sed led”- The law is hard, but it is the law
Held-The Court observed that no doubt some dealers may suffer some hardship by the impugned rules, but it is well settled that equity has no place in taxing laws vide Commissioner
of Income Taw. Fir, Muar, A.I.R. 1965 SC 1216; Commissioner of Income Tax v. M.P. Jatia, 1976(4) S.C.C. 92; D.D. Joshi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1983 SC 420; Commissioner of
Income Tax v. Ajay Products Ltd., A.I.R. 1965 SCI358; Banarasi Debi v. Income Tax Officer, A.I.R. 1964 SC 1742; Agra City Real Estate Development Organization v. State of
U.P., 2003 (3) U.P.L.B.E.C. 2201, etc. As is said "Dura lex sed led" which means "the law is hard, but it is the law." It is well settled that a statutory rule cannot be said to be
unreasonable merely because in a given case it operates harshly vide State of Gujarat v. Shantilal, A.I.R. 1969 SC 634 (vide paragraph 52). In Srinivasa Enterprises v. Union of
India, (1980) 4 S.C.C. 507 the Supreme Court observed (vide paragraph 13): "When a general evil is sought to be suppressed some martyrs may have to suffer for the Legislature
cannot easily make meticulous exception and has to proceed on board categorization not singular individualizations" Therefore, it was held that even if some dealers suffer by the
impugned rules that would not make the rules invalid.

Part-91-One Pager Snapshot to the Latest Cases

-Passing of order by mere recitation of submission by taxpayer with no discussion on merits is arbitrary
-Buyer cannot be held responsible for mistake committed by seller in generating the invoice for Bill to Ship To model and Order to be passed within 7 days from the date of service of notice
-Can State Tax Officer be Proper Authority to exercise power U/Sec 83
-Refund can only be withheld for the amount pertaining to supplies from a non-existent supplier and balance amount to be refunded
-Penalty U/Sec 129(1)(b) not applicable as E-Way Bill & Document of title to goods were accompanying goods

91.-Daily-Round-up-to-the-Latest-CasesDownload

S.No

Section

Case Subject

Case

Held

1

Section
73

Passing of order by
mere recitation of
submission by
taxpayer with no
discussion on
merits is arbitrary

Penalty U/Sec
129(1)(b) not
applicable as EWay Bill &
Document of title to
goods were
accompanying
goods

In the instant matter, the authority had while passing the order elaborately reproduced reply of the petitioner from Internal Page No. 2 of the impugned
order upto the Internal Page No. 9. However, there was no discussion and thus the High Court held that the impugned order was passed in an arbitrary
manner without considering the reply of the petitioner. The impugned order was thus set aside and the case was remitted back to the authority to pass a fresh
order on merits and in accordance with law.

2

Section
129

Buyer cannot be
held responsible for
mistake committed
by seller in
generating the
invoice for Bill to
Ship To model
Order to be passed
within 7 days from
the date of service
of notice

Tvl.T M Steel v.
Deputy State Tax
Officer [2023]
154
taxmann.com
281 (Madras)

The petitioner i.e, Tvl.T M Steel had received an order for supply from Mr. T.Balaji (HUF). The petitioner in turn had placed an order for the supply with M/s.Rashmi
Mataliks Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s.Rashmi) and instructed them to directly send the consignment to Mr.T.Balaji (HUF). The vehicle and goods were
detained as M/s.Rashmi while generating the tax invoice M/s Rashmi , correctly mentioned Name, address and GSTIN of Tvl.T.M. Steel in the Billed To column.
However, in Shipped To column, instead of mentioning Tvl.T.Balaji, it mentioned Tvl.TM Steel. But in address column, it clearly mentioned address of Tvl.T.Balaji.
The High Court observed that it can be considered as typographical error only. Moreover, it was not the mistake of Tvl.TM Steel, it was the mistake
committed by M/s.Rashmi. The authority did not communicate to the counterpart at Bengal to question M/s.Rashmi. It was not known how the authorities
penalizing the petitioner when the petitioner had not committed the said mistake. When the petitioner had not committed such mistake, the authorities had left
the goods in the vehicle for the past 10 days, thereby damaging the vehicle and goods. Further, authority had not passed order with 7 days from the date of
service of such notice. Under Section 129(3) of the Act, the order ought to be passed within 7 days from the date of serve of such notice. Since there is
clear violation of the provisions of the Act and hence the detention of goods is against the provisions. Therefore, the court directed the petitioner to pay Rs.
5,000/- as penalty and goods being released and authorities were at liberty to intimate the mistake committed by M/s.Rashmi Mataliks Limited to their counterpart in
West Bengal and take appropriate action

3

Section
83

Can State Tax
Officer be Proper
Authority to
exercise power
U/Sec 83

Saket Agarwal v.
Union of India
[2023] 154
taxmann.com
279 (Bombay)

The Court had heard the proceedings earlier and had adjourned it to enable the learned AGP to take instructions as to whether the State Tax Officer would be the
proper officer to exercise jurisdiction under Section 83 of the MGST Act so as to issue the impugned communication. It was fairly stated on instructions on the
date of hearing, that the State Tax Officer would not have any jurisdiction to issue such communication, therefore, impugned communication was
withdrawn by the officer who had issued it. The High Court thus held that as the impugned communication itself was withdrawn, an intimation of withdrawal of
such communication be immediately sent to the Officer-In-Charge of the Central Depository Services (India) Ltd.

4

Section
54

Refund can only be
withheld for the
amount pertaining
to supplies from a
non-existent
supplier and
balance amount to
be refunded

Solidum and
Stars Guild LLP
v.
Commissioner of
Central Tax,
Appeal-II, [2023]
154
taxmann.com
271 (Delhi)

Petitioner had filed a refund application and Adjudicating Authority issued a SCN proposing to reject petitioner's claim because supplier/s were reported as NonExistent by the respective jurisdictional CGST authorities. Although petitioner replied to the SCN but the Adjudicating Authority rejected petitioner's application for
refund as it was found on verification, that one of the suppliers named M/s Siddhi Impex was non-existent. There was no allegation in respect of any of the other
suppliers, the details of which were provided by the petitioner. The petitioner preferred an appeal under section 107 and the same was also rejected as one of the
supplier was found to be non-existent and concluded that the appellant 'had not received any input/input services from M/s Siddhi Impex'. However, there was no
allegation regarding any of the other suppliers, the details of which were supplied by the petitioner. The petitioner in the writ petition, did not seek to question the
decision of the Adjudicating Authority or the Appellate Authority in rejecting the petitioner's claim for refund in respect of the ITC in relation to the supplies received
from M/s Siddhi Impex; he confined his relief to refund of the ITC in respect of inputs received from other suppliers, amounting to Rs. 54,99,846.
The High Court observed that there was no allegation regarding any irregularity in respect of the supplies made by the suppliers other than M/s Siddhi
Impex. There was also no dispute as to the quantum of the ITC in respect of those supplies. Neither the Adjudicating Authority nor the Appellate Authority
has raised any doubt in respect of those supplies. Therefore, there was, no reason for denial of refund in respect of ITC pertaining to supplies made by
suppliers other than M/s Siddhi Impex

5

Section
129

Penalty U/Sec
129(1)(b) not
applicable as EWay Bill &
Document of title to
goods were
accompanying
goods

Diginx Trader
v. State of U.P.
[2023] 154
taxmann.com
267 (Allahabad)

Writ Petition was filed against the order whereunder penalty of Rs. 72,76,500/- had been levied upon the petitioner by not treating the petitioner to be the owner of
goods. Admittedly, the goods were duly accompanied by the tax invoice, e-way bill and bilty issued in the name of the petitioner as the consignee. It was further
contended that the petitioner was the owner of the goods and was ready and willing to deposit penalty under protest under section 129(1) (a) to get the goods
released considering the perishable nature of the goods and diminishing of its value substantially with the onset of monsoons.
The High Court observed that revenue could not dispute the fact that intention to evade tax is a per-requisite for imposition of penalty under section 129.
E-way Bills being the documents of title to the goods were accompanying the goods hence, conclusion of revenue that the petitioner was not the owner
of the goods is patently erroneous. Consequently, it was held that penalty proceedings were liable to be initiated U/Sec129(1)(a) and not 129(1)(b) as was done.
Case Relied- Sahil Traders v. State of U.P. [Writ (Tax) No. 178 of 2023, dated 25-5-2023

Part-90-One Pager Snapshot to the Latest Cases

-Rejection of Application of New Registration on account of alleged short payment of tax in the earlier registration
-SCN to indicate as to what fraud is alleged to have been committed and which statement made by petitioner was alleged to be a misstatement; and which fact was suppressed by the petitioner.
-SCN did not clarify whether registration was proposed to be cancelled on account of fraud or wilful misstatement or suppression of facts as all three reasons indicated.
-order of provisional attachment ceases to subsisT on Passing of Final assessment order under section 74,
-Nature and complexity of the acts and the interest of revenue to be considered before passing an order for Audit under Section 66

90.-Daily-Round-up-to-the-Latest-CasesDownload

S.No

Section

Case Subject

case

Held

1

Section
29 and
30

Rejection of
Application of New
Registration on
account of alleged
short payment of
tax in the earlier
registration

Gopal Selvam v.
Assistant
Commissioner
(ST) [2023] 154
taxmann.com
337 (Madras)

Petitioner failed to file returns in time and therefore, the petitioner's registration was cancelled on 25.01.2022. Thereafter, petitioner had filed returns for the entire
period on 24.04.2023 in GSTR-10. Petitioner also filed a fresh application for registration on the same day, which was rejected. The department contended that from
period beginning from 2017, petitioner has debited tax liability only from ITC and only a sum of Rs.59,448/- has been paid in cash during the period in dispute.
The Court held that denial of fresh registration to petitioner cannot be justified particularly considering the fact that the petitioner will get into business
one way or the other for his livelihood. By declining registration, the Department is going to be the looser. There will be a leakage of revenue as the
petitioner will continue to do business without registration.
Cases Relied Upon- M/s.Suguna Cutpiece Center Vs. Appellate Deputy Commissioner (ST) (GST), 2022 (2) TMI 933

2

Section
29 and
30

SCN to indicate as
to what fraud is
alleged to have
been committed
and which
statement made by
petitioner was
alleged to be a
misstatement; and
which fact was
suppressed by the
petitioner

Frequent
Logistics
Services (P.) Ltd.
v. Commissioner
Goods &
Services Tax
Department
[2023] 154
taxmann.com
336 (Delhi)

Impugned order was passed pursuant to SCN which indicated that petitioner's GST Registration was proposed to be cancelled for the reason that "In case,
Registration has been obtained by means of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts." Revenue contended that petitioner's GST registration was cancelled
as it was not found to be existing at its principal place of business.
The Court held that SCN was cryptic and did not afford the petitioner any sufficient information as to the grounds on which the petitioner's registration
was proposed to be cancelled. Although, SCN alleged that registration was obtained by fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts, there was no
material to indicate as to what fraud is alleged to have been committed; which statement made by the petitioner was alleged to be a misstatement; and
which fact was suppressed by the petitioner. It was also not clear whether petitioner's registration was cancelled on account of fraud, wilful misstatement
or suppression of facts, since all three reasons were mentioned. SCN did not disclose that petitioner's Registration was proposed to be cancelled with
retrospective effect. The impugned order also did not reflect any ground to support the decision to cancel GST registration with retrospective effect. For
the reason that, petitioner was not found existing on its place of business, Court observed that petitioner had made an application for change of its registered principal
place of business. The application was allowed and amended certificate of GST Registration was issued. Admittedly, concerned officer had inspected the old premises
and not the new premises as reflected in the certificate of the GST registration. Thus, impugned order cancelling the petitioner's GST registration was set aside

3

Section
29 and
30

SCN did not clarify
whether registration
was proposed to be
cancelled on
account of fraud or
wilful misstatement
or suppression of
facts as all three
reasons indicated.

Green Polymers
v. Union of India
[2023] 154
taxmann.com
330 (Delhi)

Petitioner was issued a SCN proposing to cancel GST registration on the ground that it was obtained by 'fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts'.
However, without referring to any of the material, as provided by petitioner, GST registration was cancelled. Petitioner immediately applied for revocation of
cancellation which was allowed. Notwithstanding that petitioner's GST registration was restored; respondent issued impugned SCN again and again cancelled
petitioner's registration.
The Court held that the impugned SCN apart from alleging that registration was obtain by fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts - which was also the
ground on which the petitioners' GST registration was cancelled in the earlier round, did not indicate any specific reason(s) for proposing cancellation OF registration.
Impugned SCN was thus incapable of eliciting any meaningful response as it did not indicate as to what was the fraud allegedly perpetuated by the
petitioner or the wilful misstatement allegedly made. It also did not indicate as to which material fact was suppressed by the petitioner. It is also not clear
whether the petitioner's GST registration was proposed to be cancelled on account of fraud or wilful misstatement or suppression of facts as all three
reasons indicated.

4

Section
83

Order of provisional
attachment ceases
to subsist, once
Final assessment
order passed under
section 74

Rina Jaiswal v.
Commissioner of
Central Tax
[2023] 154
taxmann.com
329 (Telangana)

Petitioner's bank accounts and properties of petitioner were provisionally attached vide orders dated 15-7-2022 under section 83 of CGST Act. Subsequently
order-in-original passed under Section 74 were challenged by way of filing of appeal under section 107 of CGST Act, which was pending.
The Court relying upon the decision of Supreme Court in the matter of Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh 2021(48) G.S.T.L 113, held
that once a final order of assessment had been passed under section 74, order of provisional attachment must cease to subsist.

5

Section
66

Nature and
complexity of the
acts and the
interest of revenue
to be considered
before passing an
order for Audit
under Section 66

Rajkamal & Co. v.
Union of India
[2023] 154
taxmann.com
284 (Gauhati)

It was contended by the petitioner that competent authority before passing an order for Special Audit under Section 66, with prior approval of the Commissioner,
has to form an opinion that the value has not been correctly declared or the credit availed is not within the normal limits. In order to reach such an opinion, there are
two aspects which are to be considered as condition precedent, firstly, the nature and complexity of the acts; and secondly, the interest of revenue. The two condition
precedents were contended to be found apparently absent in the impugned order. Therefore, it is clear non-application of mind on the part of the said authority and
thus, arbitrary.
The Court directed that having regard to the provisions of Section 66 and Section 107 of the CGST Act, 2017 vis-à-vis the contents of the impugned order
dated 16-11-2020 which prima facie did not reflect about consideration of the two aspects mentioned in Section 66 of the CGST Act, 2017, it was provided
that the respondent authorities shall not take any coercive action against the petitioner till the returnable date

Part-89-One Pager Snapshot to Cases on “Phrase in Brackets” for interpretation of Statute

Snapshot contains cases on how interpretation of “Phrase in Brackets” have been made and whether such “Phrase in Brackets” extends, curtails or explains the term preceding it vis-à-vis the context in which, they have been used.

89.-Daily-Round-up-to-the-Latest-CasesDownload

S.No

Case

Held

1

Zamil Steel
Buildings India
Pvt ... vs The
State Of
Maharashtra And
Anr (Bom HC)

Provision Interpreted-(iv) iron and steel, that is to say,— (v) steel structurals (angles, joists, channels, tees, sheet piling sections, Z sections or any other rolled sections);
Held- What can be discerned from the aforesaid decision is that words, clauses or a sentence appearing in parenthesis / brackets are inserted in a passage as an
explanation or an afterthought, which is otherwise also, grammatically complete without it. To put it simply, the purpose of a parenthesis is ordinarily to insert an
illustration, explanation, definition or additional piece of information of any sort into a sentence that is logically and grammatically complete without it. It was thus held
that the words appearing inside the parenthesis / brackets in both the aforesaid provisions, namely “(angles, joists, channels, tees, sheet piling sections, Z sections or
any other rolled sections)” cannot restrict or limit the words “steel structurals” appearing outside it.

2

M/S Dozco India
P.Ltd vs M/S
Doosan Infracore
Co.Ltd on 8
October, 2010
(SC)

Provision Interpreted- Article 23. Arbitration -- 23.1: All disputes arising in connection with this agreement shall be finally settled by arbitration in Seoul, Korea (or such
other place as the parties may agree in writing), pursuant to the rules of agreement then in force of the International Chamber of Commerce."
Held- It was contended by the petitioner that due to the presence of bracketed portion "or such other place as the parties may agree in writing", the seat of arbitration could be
elsewhere also. The Court held that it was not possible to accept the contention for the simple reason that a bracket could not be allowed to control the main clause. The
bracketed portion is only for the purposes of further explanation. The counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent was held to be right in contending that the
bracketed portion was meant only for the convenience of the Arbitral Tribunal and/or the parties for conducting the proceedings of the arbitration, but the bracketed
portion does not, in any manner, change the seat of arbitration, which is only Seoul, Korea

3

Shrikishan And
Company vs
Additional
Commissioner Of
... on 18 June,
2018

Provision Interpreted-Entry referred as bitumen (coal-tar)
Held-The High Court observed that Supreme Court while dealing with the question whether bitumen emulsion is covered within Entry 22 of Part A of Schedule II to the U.P. Value
Added Tax Act, 2008, which only refers to bitumen that bitumen includes bitumen emulsion. It has also been held that the words inside the brackets i.e. coal-tar in front of
bitumen would not control the meaning of the words outside the bracket and it would not curtail or limit the scope of the words employed outside the bracket. The word
bitumen is also known as commercially, coal-tar as such, the word coal-tar in brackets in front of bitumen is only clarificatory in nature and would not control the
meaning and scope of the word bitumen in Entry-23 under Part II of Schedule-II of the VAT Act.

4

Larsen and
Toubro Ltd. v.
State of
Karnataka [2013]
38 taxmann.com
453(SC)

Provision Interpreted-Article 366(29A)(b) of Constitution of India- "goods (whether as goods or in some other form)"
Held- The definition of "goods" in clause (12) is inclusive. It includes all materials, commodities and articles. The expression, "goods" has a broader meaning than merchandise.
Chattels or movables are goods within the meaning of clause (12). Sub- clause (b) refers to transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved
in the execution of a works contract. The expression "in some other form" in the bracket is of utmost significance as by this expression the ordinary understanding of
the term "goods" has been enlarged by bringing within its fold goods in a form other than goods. Goods in some other form would thus mean goods which have ceased to
be chattels or movables or merchandise and become attached or embedded to earth. In other words, goods which by incorporation become part of immovable property are deemed
as goods.

5

Commissioner of
Income Tax Vs
Aspinwal & Co.
Ltd (June 13,
1972)

Provision Interpreted- 2. (18) company in which the public are substantially interested.--A company is said to be a company in which the public are substantially
interested--......(b) if it is not a private company as defined in the Companies Act, 1956; and
(i) its shares (not being shares entitled to a fixed rate of dividend whether with or without a further right to participate in profits) carrying not less than fifty per cent. of
the voting power have been allotted unconditionally to, or acquired unconditionally by, and were throughout the relevant previous year beneficially held by, the
Government or a corporation established by a Central, State or Provincial Act or the public (not being a director, or a company to which this clause does not apply)......"
Held- The High Court held that that the words mentioned immediately after and put within brackets, namely, "not being a director or a company to which this clause does not apply
" are stated by way of exception to the scope of the expression " the public ". They throw considerable light upon the otherwise ambiguous import of the expression " the public ".
These words in brackets really act as a guide to understand the intention of the legislature. When the words in brackets exclude a company to which this clause does not
apply, they necessarily imply that a company to which this clause applied will come within the scope of the expression "the public"

6

2008] 2008
taxmann.com
1113 (SC)
Orient Traders
v. Commercial tax
Officer

Provision Interpreted- Under Item 20 of the First Schedule to the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, the original rate prescribed on “Bullion and Specie” was 2%.
However, State Government issued Notification reducing the rate of sales tax to 1
/
2% in respect of 'bullion and specie (gold)' from the date of the said Notification.
Held- It was contended by the petitioner that the bracketed words "gold" used in the above G.O. applies only to specie and not to bullion. The Court however held that "Bullion and
specie" is one single phrase and the same cannot be bifurcated. The intention of the Government in putting the word 'gold' in the bracket after the words 'bullion and specie'
clearly shows that the intention of the Government was to extend the benefit of reduced rate of tax to gold bullion and gold specie only and not to silver. The word 'gold'
was put in brackets to indicate that the concessional rate of tax is applicable only to the gold in either of the two forms i.e. bullion or specie. Had the intention been to extend the
benefit of reduced rate of tax to silver bullion and specie, then, there was no need to put the word 'gold' in brackets after 'bullion and specie'

Part-88-One Pager Snapshot to the Cases on “Use of “such”” for interpretation of Statute

Snapshot contains few instances wherein principle for interpretation of “such” has been explained and how one can identify what is the term to which “such” relates itself to in the provision.

88.-Daily-Round-up-to-the-Latest-CasesDownload

S.No

Case

Held

1

Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Punjab,
Himachal
Pradesh and
Bilaspur,
Simla v. Jagan
Math
Maheshwary
(P & H HC)

Provision Interpreted-If in consequence of definite information which has come into his possession the Income Tax Officer discovers that income, profits or gains
chargeable to Income Tax have escaped assessment in any year or have been under assessed or have been assessed at top low a rate, or have been the subject of excess
relief under this Act, the Income Tax Officer may, in any case in which he has reason to believe that the assesses has concealed the particulars of his income or deliberately
furnished inaccurate particulars thereof, at any time within eight years, and in any other case at any time within four years of the end of that year, serve on the person
liable to pay tax on such income, profits or gains, or, in the case of a company, on the principal officer thereof, a notice containing all or any of the requirements which
may be included in a notice under Sub-section (2) of Section 22, and may proceed to assess or reassess such income, profits or gains, and the provisions of this Act shall,
so far as may be, apply accordingly as if the notice were a notice issued under that sub-section:
Held-The petitioner contended that, the term "such income etc., etc." refers, not to the entire escaped income but to that part of it only, with respect to which, the Income
Tax Officer had a definite information, in consequence of which, he had discovered the escapement. The Court held that the word "such" indicates something just before
specified, or spoken of, that is proximately, and not merely previously. It particularises the immediately preceding antecedent, and not everything that has gone before. It signifies what
has preceded proximately and not just previously or formerly and therefore the word "such" occurring in Section 34, has to be attributed to the last antecedent, namely, escaped
or under-assessed etc, income, profits or gains, without in any way further linking it with any particular escapement that was discovered in consequence of any definite
information

2

Tamalarasi vs
S.Kumarasam
y Gounder on
18 June, 2003
(Mad)

Provision Interpreted-"Sec.2(aa) "Cultivating tenant"- (i) means a person who contributes his own physical labour or that of any member of his family in the cultivation of
any land belonging to another, under a tenancy agreement, express or implied; and (ii) includes- (a) any such person who continues in possession of the land after the
determination of the tenancy agreement;"
Held- It was held that the words "such person" refer to a person referred earlier. The person referred earlier in Section 2(aa)(i) is one who contributes his own physical
labour or that of any member of his family in cultivation of any land. Or in other words, Section 2(aa)(ii)(a) has to be understood as any person who contributes his own
physical labour in the cultivation or that of any member of his family in the property in which he is in possession even after determination of tenancy agreement. If mere
possession is sufficient the Law makers would not have employed the word 'such' in Section 2(aa)(ii)(a).

3

Union Of India
(Uoi) And Ors.
vs Wazir
Singh (Raj)
AIR 1980 Raj
252, 1980
WLN 353

Provision Interpreted- Where a Special Appeal from the judgment of one Judge does not lie unless such Judge has declared that the case is a fit one for appeal, an
application for such declaration may be made orally before or at the time when the judgment is delivered. No such application shall be entertained later. The Court shall
thereupon record an order granting or refusing to grant such declaration".
Held-The petitioner contended that the words "no such application" occurring in the rule refer to an oral application and not to a written application. It was observed that
generally, the word 'such' refers only to previously indicated, characterized or specified. "Such" is an adjective meaning the one previously indicated or refers only to something which
has been said before. "Such" is defined by Webster as "having the particular quality or character specified; certain; representing the object as already particularized in terms which are
not mentioned." Thus, it was held that contextually the words "no such application" refer to "application for such declaration" and not to "may be made orally".

4

Central Bank
Of India vs
Ravindra And
Ors on 18
October, 2001
(SC)

Provision Interpreted- 34. (1) Where and in so far a decree is for the payment of money, the Court may, in the decree, order interest at such rate as the Court deems
reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged, from the date of the suit to the date of the decree, in addition to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any
period prior to the institution of the suit, (with further interest at such rate as the Court deems reasonable on the aggregate sum so adjudged.] from the date of the decree
to the date of payment, or to such earlier date as the Court thinks fit.
Held-It was held that, the use of the word "such" as an adjective prefixed to a noun is indicative of the draftsman's intention that he is assigning the same meaning or characteristic to
the noun as has been previously indicated or that he is referring to something which has been said before. This principle has all the more vigorous application when the two places
employing the same expression, at earlier place the expression having been defined or characterised and at the latter place having been qualified by use of the word "such", are situated
in close proximity. Thus, the court was of the opinion that the meaning assigned to the expression 'the principal sum adjudged' should continue to be assigned to "principal
sum" at such other places in Section 34(1) where the expression has been used qualified by the adjective "such" that is to say, as "such principal sum"

5

Circular No.
159/15/2021-
GST Dated
20-09-2021

Provision Interpreted- Intermediary means a broker, an agent or any other person, by whatever name called, who arranges or facilitates the supply of goods or services or
both, or securities, between two or more persons, but does not include a person who supplies such goods or services or both or securities on his own account.”
Clarified- The definition of intermediary services specifically mentions that intermediary “does not include a person who supplies such goods or services or both or
securities on his own account”. Use of word “such” in the definition with reference to supply of goods or services refers to the main supply of goods or services or both,
or securities, between two or more persons, which are arranged or facilitated by the intermediary. It implies that in cases wherein the person supplies the main supply, either
fully or partly, on principal to principal basis, the said supply cannot be covered under the scope of “intermediary”

Part-87-One Pager Snapshot to the Cases on Use of “or” and “and” and interchangeability of “or as and” and vice versa for interpretation of Statute

Snapshot contains brief of cases on interpretation of ordinary meaning of “or” and  “and” and why “or” has to be read as “and” or vice-versa by applying the general rule that words should be construed to ascertain the intention of the provision in question to be collected from the whole of its terms.

87.-Daily-Round-up-to-the-Latest-CasesDownload

S.No

Case

Held

1

India Sri Jeyaram
Educational Trust
vs A.G. Syed
Mohideen & Ors
(SC)

Provision Interpreted-The provision enabled a suit being filed in the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive Trust created for public purposes of a
charitable or religious nature, `in the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or in any other Court empowered in that behalf by the State Government within the
local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the Trust is situate'.
Held- The word "or" is used in ordinary sense, that is to denote an alternative, giving a choice and provisions of section 92 do not give room for interpreting the word "or" as
a substitutive, so as to lead to an interpretation that when Government notified any other court, such notified court alone will have jurisdiction and not District Court.

2

M/S Hyderabad
Asbestos Cement
... vs Union Of
India & Ors on 7
December, 1999
(SC)

Provision Interpreted-Provided that no credit of duty shall be allowed in respect of any material or component parts used in the manufacture of finished excisable
goods- (i) if such finished excisable goods produced by the manufacturer are exempted from the whole of the duty of excise leviable thereon or are chargeable to nil
rate of duty, and (ii) unless--- (a) duty has been paid for such material or component parts under the same item or sub-item as the finished excisable goods; or (b)
remission or adjustment of duty paid for such material or component parts has been specifically sanctioned by the Central Government;
Held-The language of the rule is plain and simple. It does not admit of any doubt in interpretation. Proviso (i) and (ii) are separated by the use of conjunction `and'. They have
to be read conjointly. The requirement of both the provisos has to be satisfied to avail the benefit. Clauses (a) and (b) of proviso (ii) are separated by the use of an `or'
and there the availability of one of the two alternatives would suffice

3

Union Of India &
Ors vs Rabinder
Singh on 29
September, 2011
(SC)

Provision Interpreted-"52. Offences in respect of property - Any person subject to this Act who commits any of the following offences, that is to say,- (f) does any other
thing with intent to defraud, or to cause wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person, shall, on conviction by court-martial, be liable to suffer
imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years or such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned.
Held- We accept the submission of Shri Tripathi that the two parts of Section 52 (f) are disjunctive, which can also be seen from the fact that there is a comma and the
conjunction `or' between the two parts of this sub-section, viz (i) does any other thing with intend to defraud and (ii) to cause wrongful gain to one person or wrongful
loss to another person. If the legislature wanted both these parts to be read together, it would have used the conjunction `and'.

4

Shaik Ahmed
Versus State Of
Telangana (SC)
(28-06-2021)

Provision Interpreted-“364A. Kidnapping for ransom, etc.—Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person or keeps a person in detention after such kidnapping or abduction
and threatens to cause death or hurt to such person, or by his conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to death or hurt, or causes
hurt or death to such person in order to compel the Government or any foreign State or international inter-governmental organisation or any other person to do or
abstain from doing any act or to pay a ransom, shall be punishable with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.”
Held-Apex Court observed that Section 364A uses the word “or” nine times and the whole section contains only one conjunction “and”, which joins the first and second
condition. The first essential condition as incorporated in Section 364A is “whoever kidnaps or abducts any person or keeps a person in detention after such kidnapping or
abduction”. The second condition begins with conjunction “and”. The second condition has also two parts, i.e., (a) threatens to cause death or hurt to such person or (b) by his
conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to death or hurt. Either part of above condition, if fulfilled, shall fulfill the second condition for offence.
The third condition begins with the word “or”, i.e., or causes hurt or death to such person in order to compel the Government or any foreign State or international inter-governmental
organisation or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act or to pay a ransom. Third condition begins with the word “or causes hurt or death to such person in order to
compel the Government or any foreign state to do or abstain from doing any act or to pay a ransom”. Therefore, since condition Nos. 1 & 2 of Section 364A has been added with
conjunction “and”, therefore, condition No.2 has also to be fulfilled before ingredients of Section 364A are found to be established. Section 364A also indicates that in case, condition
“and threatens to cause death or hurt to such person” is not proved, there are other classes which begins with word “or”, those conditions, if proved, offence will be established.

5

National
Insurance Co. Ltd.
vs Mary Janet
And Ors. on 23
July, 1998
Equivalent
citations: 1999
ACJ 736 (Ker)

Provision Interpreted-170. Impleading insurer in certain cases.-Where in the course of any inquiry, the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that- (a) there is collusion between
the person making the claim and the person against whom the claim is made, or (b) the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim, it may,
for reasons to be recorded in writing,..
Held- On a plain reading of the above section it would appear that the two conditions specified therein are alternative, but on a closer scrutiny, it would appear to be otherwise; they
are conjunctive in application in the present context. The word 'or' may of course connect alternative objects but not necessarily. It is often used not to connect real
alternatives but merely to connect different words expressing the same or cognate idea. When the question is examined in view of the above legal premise, the two
conditions mentioned in Section 170 cannot be said to be mutually exclusive. When there is collusion between the person making the claim and the person against whom the
claim is made the second condition that the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim is a condition inclusive of the former. Both the conditions connote
a cognate idea and also envisage an intention of generality meaning thereby, the collusion between the parties can also be by failing themselves to contest the claim. These Clauses
(a) and (b) of Section 170 cannot be interpreted as mutually exclusive because the former clause does not exclude the latter clause and the latter clause includes within the operative
premises of (he former clause. Therefore, in order to attract the provision contained in Section 170 the two conditions provided in Clauses (a) and (b) thereof must be satisfied

Part-86-One Pager Snapshot to the Cases on “Rule of Last Antecedent”

Lets have interesting read of this principle..

Interpretation of Article 47 of Constitution of India-“intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health”…

Whether condition of “injurious to health” attached to both intoxicating drinks and drugs or only drugs..

Snapshot presents you with a brief gist of cases on this Principle..

86.-Daily-Round-up-to-the-Latest-CasesDownload

S.No

Case

Held

1

Blacklaw Dictionary

This is an interpretative principle by which a court determines that qualifying words or phrases modify the words or phrases immediately preceding them and not words or phrases
more remote, unless the extension is necessary from the context or the spirit of the entire writing. The lexicon exemplifies the canon: in the phrase 'Texas courts, New
Mexico courts, and New York courts in the federal system,' the words 'in the federal system' might be held to modify only New York courts and not Texas courts or
New Mexico courts. This canon is variably termed 'the doctrine of the last antecedent'; 'the doctrine of the last preceding antecedent.'

2

ACTO v. Hemant
Plastic Udyog [2014]
47 taxmann.com 66
(Rajasthan)

Provision Interpreted- 39. Plastic goods, PVC granules except when used as raw material for production of plastic goods.
Held-Entry 39 aforesaid carries a coma after the words "plastic goods", is then followed by the words "PVC granules". The subsequent words in the entry 39 "except when
used as raw material for production of plastic goods" immediately following the words PVC granules would in my considered opinion only relate to PVC granules
used as raw material for production of plastic goods. To my mind, the "rule of last antecedent" applies to the interpretation of entry 39 of notification dated 30.03.2000.

3

M.S. Anoop v/s State
of Kerala WP(C) No.
33709 of 2015 (Ker)

Provision Interpreted-Article 47 of Constitution of India- “the State will endeavour to prohibit the consumption except for medicinal purposes of intoxicating drinks
and of drugs which are injurious to health”.
Held- Of the two evils, intoxicating drinks, as a whole, face the axe, while only those drugs harmful to health get outlawed, for ‘drugs’ is employed generically and followed
asyndetically with the relative qualifier ‘harmful to health.’ The Constitution, therefore, presumes that any drink intoxicating is harmful. In other words, ‘intoxicating drinks’
does not get qualified by ‘harmful to health.’ The canon of construction, we suppose, applicable is that of the last antecedent.

4

Classic Builders And
Developers vs Union
Of India And Ors.
(MP) 2001 251 ITR
492 MP

Provision Interpreted-Section 131(1A) of Income Tax Act-If the Director-General or Director or Joint Director or Assistant Director or Deputy Director, or the
authorised officer referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 132 before he takes action under Clauses (i) to (v) of that sub-section..
Held- It is this rule, which was being consistently applied by the Privy Council and the Supreme Court while interpreting several words used in the sections of different Acts. If
the aforesaid rule is applied for interpreting Sub-section (1A) of Section 131 and particularly to the words mentioned supra then, in my opinion, the words "referred
to in Sub-section (1) of Section 132 before he takes action under Clauses (i) to (v) of that sub-section" do not qualify the words--Director-General, Director, Joint
Director, Assistant Director, Deputy Director but only qualify the words "the authorised officer" which precede them. In other words, these words are meant only for the
last and sixth specified authority, namely, "authorised officer", and not other five authorities named therein

5

Mongibai Hariram vs
State Of Maharashtra
(SC)1966 AIR 882

Provision Interpreted- "Premises" in the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948-“any building or part of a building let or intended to be let separately”
Held- The question was interpreting words, "any building or part of a building let or intended to be let separately". Relying upon the principle and the rule of last antecedent,
their Lordships held that the words "let or intended to be let separately" did not qualify the word "building" but only qualified the words "part of a building"

6

Irrawaddy Flotilla
Company v.
Bugwandas [1891]
ILR 18Cal620 (PC)

Provision Interpreted-Section 1 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872- "nothing herein contained shall affect the provisions of any statute, Act or Regulation not hereby
expressly repealed, nor any usage or custom of trade, nor any incident of any contract, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act"
Held-The words "not inconsistnet with the provisions of this Act", are not to be connected with the clause "nor any usage or custom of trade" and if such a sentence
is to be tried by any rules of grammar, seems to require that the application of those words should be confined to the subject which immediately precedes them.

7

Govindrao and
Others
Vs Bhavarlal and
Others (MP) (1992)
11 MP CK 0047

Provision Interpreted-M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961-(e) "member of family" in case of any person means the spouse, son, unmarried daughter, father,
grandfather, mother, grandmother, brother, unmarried sister, paternal uncle, paternal uncle''s wife, or widow or brother''s son or unmarried daughter living joinlty
with, or any other relation dependent on him.
Held-As such, if we read the relations named in the definition minutely, we find, that in the first category the persons who are naturally supposed to live together in one family
have been put in a separate class because after the words paternal uncle''s wife or widow a comma has been put and thereafter the word ''or'' is used and then brother''s son or
unmarried daughter have been named with a condition that they were living jointly with the landlord, and thereafter again the word "or" is used and the words any other relations
dependant to him have been inserted. As such in the aforesaid context the conjunction "or" is used in the aforesaid definition at two places is manifestly disjunctive
and, therefore, if the rule of Last Antecedent is made applicable, we find that the qualifying term "living jointly" shall be applicable only in the case of brother''s son
or unmarried daughter and the term "dependent on him" shall be applicable in the case of only any other relations

8

Mahadeolal Kanodia
vs The AdministratorGeneral (SC)
1960 AIR 936

Provision Interpreted-Provided that the provisions of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949, as amended by this Act, shall, subject to the provisions of s. 9, also
apply and be deemed to have always applied to all suits, appeals and proceedings pending..
Appellant argued that the phrase " as amended by this Act " qualifies the word " provisions ". The Court observed that if this be correct, the meaning of the proviso will be that
only those provisions of the Act which have been amended by the Act shall apply and be deemed to have applied always to pending proceedings, but it was held that If ordinary
grammatical rules are applied there is no escape from the conclusion that the "as amended by this Act " qualifies proximate substantive, viz., Calcutta, Thika
Tenancy Act, 1949

Part-85-One Pager Snapshot to Cases on Interpretation of “Any”

Difference between “A Tenant” and “Any Tenant” and scope of “service of any description”..“Any child” reflects to single child or children..Relevance of context ..Snapshot covers Interpretation of “Any”..

85.-Daily-Round-up-to-the-Latest-CasesDownload

S.No

Case

Held

1

Associated
Indem
Mechanical ...
vs West
Bengal Small
Scale (SC)

Provision Interpreted- Section 2(c) of West Bengal Government Premises (Tenancy Regulation) Act, 1976- "premises" means any building or hut and includes part of a
building or hut and a seat in a room, let separately, and also includes -(i) the gardens, grounds and out-houses, if any, appurtenant thereto,
(ii) any furniture supplied or any fittings or fixtures affixed for the use of the tenant in such building, hut or seat in a room, as the case may be;
Opening part of the definition of the word "premises" in Section 2(c) employs the word "any". Any is a word of very wide meaning and prime facie the use of it excludes
limitation. (See Angurbala Mullick v. Debabrata Mullick AIR 1951 SC 293 at 297). The definition of premises in Section 2(c) uses the word "includes" at two places. It is well settled
that the word "include" is generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute. Therefore, it was held
there is no warrant for restricting applicability of the Act to residential buildings alone on the ground that in opening part of definition of "premises", words "building or hut" were used.

2

Angurbala
Mullick v.
Debabrata
Mullick AIR
1951 SC 293

Provision Interpreted-Section 3(1) of Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act- When a Hindu governed by the Dayabhaga School of Hindu law dies intestate leaving any
property, and when a Hindu governed by any other school of Hindu law.. ....... dies intestate leaving separate property, his widow, or if there is more than one widow all his
widows together, shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), be entitled in respect of property in respect of which he dies intestate to the same share as a son:
Section 3(1) speaks of "any property". The expression prima facie includes, unless something to the contrary can be spelt out from the other provisions of the Act, all forms
or types of interest answering to the description of "property" in law.

3

Lucknow
Development
Authority vs
M.K. Gupta
(SC)
1994 AIR 787

Provision Interpreted-Section 2(1)(o) of Consumer Protection Act- "service' means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes the
provision of facilities in connection with banking, financing, insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both, housing
construction, entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge…;"
The word 'any' dictionary means 'one or some or all'. In Black's Law Dictionary it is explained thus, "word, ‘any' has a diversity of meaning and may be employed to indicate
'all' or ,every' as well as 'some' or 'one' and its meaning in a given statute depends upon the context and the subject- matter of the statute". The use of the word ‘any' in the
context it has been used in clause (o) indicates that it has been used in wider sense extending from one to all.

4

Shri
Balaganesan
Metals vs Shri
M.N.
Shanmugham
Chetty & Ors
on 23 April,
1987 (SC)

Provision Interpreted- Section 10(3)(c) of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960- A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, whether residential
or non-residential, may, notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a), apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of
the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, it he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for purposes of a business...
In construing Section 10(3)(c) it is pertinent to note that the words used are "any tenant" and not "a tenant" who can be called upon to vacate the portion in his occupation. The word
"any" has the following meaning:- "Some; one out of many; an indefinite number. One indiscriminately of whatever kind or quantity." Word "any" has a diversity of meaning
and may be employed to indicate "all" or "every" as well as "some" or "one" and its meaning in a given statute depends upon the context and the subject matter of the statute. It is often
synonymous with "either", "every" or "all". Its generality may be restricted by context; (Black's Law Dictionary; Fifth Edition). Unless the legislature had intended that both classes
of tenants can be asked to vacate by the Rent Controller for providing the landlord additional accommodation be it for residential or non-residential purposes. it would not
have used the word "any" instead of using the letter "a" to denote a tenant.

5

Shanti And
Ors. vs
Bhagwani And
Ors (P & H)
AIR 1984 P H
313

Provision Interpreted-Section 109 of The Indian Succession Act, 1925—Where a bequest has been made to any child or other lineal descendant of the testator, and the
legatee dies in the lifetime of the testator, but any lineal descendant of his survives the testator, the bequest shall not lapse, but shall take effect as if the death of the
legatee had happened immediately after the death of the testator, unless a contrary intention appears by the Will.
The question before the Court was whether the words 'any child' used is Section 109 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 means "one child only" or it can mean "children"
also, as the case may be, is the main point involved in this second appeal. The Court held that it appears that the worm 'any child' includes plural also Section 109 of the Act was
specifically framed, whenever will was in favour of a child or children of the testator or in favour of other lineal descendant or descendants oil the testator.

6

Pashupati
Nath Sinha vs
State Of Bihar
1978 (26)
BLJR 849
(Pat)

Provision Interpreted- Section 13(1) in The Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973-The High Court may, if requested by the Central or State Government so to do, confer upon
any person who holds or has held any post under the Government, all or any of the powers conferred or conferrable by or under this Code on a Judicial Magistrate 1 of the
first class or of the second class, in respect to particular cases or to particular classes of cases, in any local area, not being a metropolitan area.
It was contended that High Court could appoint Special Magistrates and clothe them with all or any of the powers conferrable on a Judicial Magistrate of the Second Class in respect to
particular classes of cases or to cases generally within a district and not for the whole State and the expression "in any district" must be read as limiting the jurisdiction of the Magistrates
to be vested with said powers. It was held there was no justification for giving the word 'any' a narrow interpretation to construe that Special Magistrate could be appointed
only for one district as it would frustrate object of Act which empowers High Court to appoint Special Magistrate for particular classes of cases or to cases generally

Part-84-One Pager Snapshot to Cases on use of “The” in a Statute

Use of “The Bank” and “A Bank” or “The Assessee” twice the in same provision reflect different Intent or have to be given same interpretation..Implications of use of “the agreement” and “the proper officer”…

84.-Daily-Round-up-to-the-Latest-CasesDownload

S.No

Case

Held

1

Shri Ishar
Alloy Steels
Ltd vs
Jayaswals
Neco Limited
on 22
February,
2001-(SC)

Provision Interpreted- Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act-Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless—
(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier
The use of the words "a bank" and "the bank" in the Section is indicator of the intention of the Legislature. The former is indirect article and the latter is pre-fixed by direct
article. If the Legislature intended to have the same meanings for "a bank" and "the bank", there was no cause or occasion for mentioning it distinctly and differently by
using two different articles. It is worth noticing that the word "banker" in Section 3 of the Act is pre-fixed by the indefinite article "a" and the word "bank" where the cheque
is intended to be presented under Section 138 is pre-fixed by the definite article "the". The same Section permits a person to issue a cheuqe on an account maintained by him
with "a bank" and makes him liable for criminal prosecution if it is returned by "the bank" unpaid. The payment of the cheque is contemplated by "the bank" meaning thereby where the
person issuing the cheque has an account. "The" is the word used before nouns, with a specifying of particularising effect opposed to the indefinite or generalising force of
"a" or "an". It determines what particular thing is meant; that is, what particular thing we are to assume to be meant. "The" is always mentioned to denote particular thing
or a person.

2

Consolidated
Coffee Ltd.
and Another
vs.
Coffee
Board,
Bangalore
(SC)- 1980
SCR (3) 625

Provision Interpreted- Section 5(3) of Central Sales Tax Act, 1956-(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the last sale or purchase of any goods
preceding the sale or purchase occasioning the export of those goods out of the territory of India shall also be deemed to be in the course of such export, if such last sale
or purchase took place after, and was for the purpose of complying with, the agreement or order for or in relation to such export.
Secondly and more importantly, the user of the definite article "the" before the word "agreement" is, in our view, very significant. Parliament has not said 'an agreement'
or 'any agreement' for or in relation to such export and in the context the expression "the agreement" would refer to that agreement which is implicit in the sale occasioning
the export. Between the two sales (the penultimate and the final) spoken of in the earlier part of the sub-section ordinarily it is the final sale that would be connected with the export,
and, therefore, the expression "the agreement" for export must refer to that agreement which is implicit in the sale that occasions the export. The user of the definite article "the",
therefore, clearly suggests that the agreement spoken of must be the agreement with a foreign buyer. As a matter of pure construction it appears to us clear, therefore, that by
necessary implication the expression "the agreement" occurring in the relevant phrase means or refers to the agreement with a foreign buyer and not an agreement or any
agreement with a local party containing the covenant to export.

3

Canon India
Private
Limited
Versus
Commission
er Of
Customs
(SC) [2021]
125
taxmann.com
188 (SC)

Provision Interpreted- Section 28(4) of Customs Act-Where any duty has not been [levied or not paid or has been short levied or short-paid] or erroneously refunded, or
interest payable has not been paid, partpaid or erroneously refunded, by reason of, - (a) collusion; or (b) any wilful mis-statement; or (c) suppression of facts, by the
importer or the exporter or the agent or employee of the importer or exporter, the proper officer shall, within five years from the relevant date, serve notice on the person
chargeable with duty or interest which has not been [so levied or not paid] or which has been so short-levied or short-paid or to whom the refund has erroneously been
made, requiring him to show cause why he should not pay the amount specified in the notice.
11. Parliament has employed the article “the” not accidently but with the intention to designate the proper officer who had assessed the goods at the time of clearance. It
must be clarified that the proper officer need not be the very officer who cleared the goods but may be his successor in office or any other officer authorised to exercise
the powers within the same office. In this case, anyone authorised from the Appraisal Group.
14. As in this case, when the statute directs that “the proper officer” can determine duty not levied/not paid, it does not mean any proper officer but that proper officer alone. We find it
completely impermissible to allow an officer, who has not passed the original order of assessment, to re-open the assessment on the grounds that the duty was not paid/not levied, by
the original officer who had decided to clear the goods and who was competent and authorised to make the assessment

4

Commission
er Of IncomeTax vs T.
Veerabhadra
Rao, K.
Koteswara
(All) 1976 102
ITR 604 AP

Provision Interpreted- Section 36(2)(i) of Income Tax Act 1961-:"In making any deduction for a bad debt or part thereof, the following provisions shall apply :
(i) No such deduction shall be allowed unless such debt or part thereof--
(a) has been taken into account in computing the income of the assessee of that previous year, or of an earlier previous year, or represents money lent in the ordinary
course of the business of banking or money-lending which is carried on by the assessee, and
(b) has been written off as irrecoverable in the accounts of the assessee for that previous year."
20. ..What follows, therefore, is that if we keep the correct use of the word "the" in view, then the term "the assessee" cannot mean anything else than what we have just now said.
21. If so read, the article "the" in Clause (a) would mean the assessee into whose account the bad debt has been taken into account in computing the income of the previous
year or the assessee who had lent the bad debt money in the ordinary course of business of banking or money-lending. And for Clause (b) it would mean the assessee in
whose account such a bad debt has been written off as irrecoverable. More than this, the use of the article would not mean anything more nor is it intended to be read in
any other meaning. It, therefore, follows that merely because the article "the" is used in Clause (b) it would not necessarily mean that the two assessees for the purposes of Clauses
(a) and (b) must be one and the same assessee