Part-68-One Pager Snapshot to the Cases-

S.No

Case

Held

1

Kunhayammed v.
State of Kerala, (2000)
6 SCC 359

a) The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution is divisible into two stages. The first stage is upto the disposal of prayer for special leave to file an
appeal. The second stage commences if and when the leave to appeal is granted and the special leave petition is converted into an appeal.
b) Under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court may reverse, modify or affirm the judgment-decree or order appealed against while exercising its appellate
jurisdiction and not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction disposing of petition for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger can therefore be
applied to the former and not to the latter.
c) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing
special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as
to allow the appeal being filed.
d) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order i.e. gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of
law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law,
whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority in any
proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the
order of the court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of the
Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties.
e) Once leave to appeal has been granted and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been invoked the order passed in appeal would attract the doctrine of
merger; the order may be of reversal, modification or merely affirmation.
f) On an appeal having been preferred or a petition seeking leave to appeal having been converted into an appeal before the Supreme Court the jurisdiction of the
High Court to entertain a review petition is lost thereafter as provided by sub-rule (1) of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.”

2

Kunhayammed v.
State of Kerala, (2000)
6 SCC 359

The Apex Court observed that the earlier orders of the Court were passed at the stage of admission itself. Even the order dated 25.02.2015, passed by a 3-Judge Bench of
the Court while dealing with a batch of appeals having SLP (C) No. 35969/2009 as the lead matter, stated as follows:
“UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following ORDER Dismissed.
The Apex Court thus observed that there was no pronouncement by this Court constituting the law of the land as to the interpretation of G.O. Ms. No. 162. In such a situation,
it was open for them to proceed to decide the instant appeals uninfluenced by the prior orders of the Court dismissing SLPs.

3

Khoday Distilleries v.
Sri Mahadeshwara
Sahakara Sakkare
Karkhane Ltd., (2019)
4 SCC 376

Against this judgment of the High Court, the appellant preferred the special leave petition. This special leave petition was dismissed by this Court on December 04, 2009 with
the following order:
"Delay condoned. Special Leave Petition is dismissed.”
The Apex Court observed that since special leave petition was dismissed in limine without giving any reasons, the review petition filed by the appellant in the High Court would
be maintainable and should have been decided on merits.

4

Gojer Bros. Pvt. Ltd
vs Ratan Lal Singh on
1 May, 1974 1974 AIR
1380

In the given case, High, Court had taken the view that in cases where appellate court merely dismisses the appeal, the principle of merger has no application in cases of
execution of the original decree except as to limitation and will not affect an executable decree passed by an inferior court, in so far as its execution is concerned. The position
would be otherwise if the decree is modified or varied by such appellate authority as, in such event, the original decree, will be in executable.
The Apex Court rejected the view and held that the conclusion is clearly opposed the view taken by this Court and High Court was in error in making a distinction between an
appellate judgment whereby an appeal is dismissed and an appellate judgment modifying or reversing the decree of the lower court. This distinction is unsound and is based
on no discernible principle