S.No

Case

Held

1

Associated
Indem
Mechanical ...
vs West
Bengal Small
Scale (SC)

Provision Interpreted- Section 2(c) of West Bengal Government Premises (Tenancy Regulation) Act, 1976- "premises" means any building or hut and includes part of a
building or hut and a seat in a room, let separately, and also includes -(i) the gardens, grounds and out-houses, if any, appurtenant thereto,
(ii) any furniture supplied or any fittings or fixtures affixed for the use of the tenant in such building, hut or seat in a room, as the case may be;
Opening part of the definition of the word "premises" in Section 2(c) employs the word "any". Any is a word of very wide meaning and prime facie the use of it excludes
limitation. (See Angurbala Mullick v. Debabrata Mullick AIR 1951 SC 293 at 297). The definition of premises in Section 2(c) uses the word "includes" at two places. It is well settled
that the word "include" is generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute. Therefore, it was held
there is no warrant for restricting applicability of the Act to residential buildings alone on the ground that in opening part of definition of "premises", words "building or hut" were used.

2

Angurbala
Mullick v.
Debabrata
Mullick AIR
1951 SC 293

Provision Interpreted-Section 3(1) of Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act- When a Hindu governed by the Dayabhaga School of Hindu law dies intestate leaving any
property, and when a Hindu governed by any other school of Hindu law.. ....... dies intestate leaving separate property, his widow, or if there is more than one widow all his
widows together, shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), be entitled in respect of property in respect of which he dies intestate to the same share as a son:
Section 3(1) speaks of "any property". The expression prima facie includes, unless something to the contrary can be spelt out from the other provisions of the Act, all forms
or types of interest answering to the description of "property" in law.

3

Lucknow
Development
Authority vs
M.K. Gupta
(SC)
1994 AIR 787

Provision Interpreted-Section 2(1)(o) of Consumer Protection Act- "service' means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes the
provision of facilities in connection with banking, financing, insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both, housing
construction, entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge…;"
The word 'any' dictionary means 'one or some or all'. In Black's Law Dictionary it is explained thus, "word, ‘any' has a diversity of meaning and may be employed to indicate
'all' or ,every' as well as 'some' or 'one' and its meaning in a given statute depends upon the context and the subject- matter of the statute". The use of the word ‘any' in the
context it has been used in clause (o) indicates that it has been used in wider sense extending from one to all.

4

Shri
Balaganesan
Metals vs Shri
M.N.
Shanmugham
Chetty & Ors
on 23 April,
1987 (SC)

Provision Interpreted- Section 10(3)(c) of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960- A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, whether residential
or non-residential, may, notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a), apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of
the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, it he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for purposes of a business...
In construing Section 10(3)(c) it is pertinent to note that the words used are "any tenant" and not "a tenant" who can be called upon to vacate the portion in his occupation. The word
"any" has the following meaning:- "Some; one out of many; an indefinite number. One indiscriminately of whatever kind or quantity." Word "any" has a diversity of meaning
and may be employed to indicate "all" or "every" as well as "some" or "one" and its meaning in a given statute depends upon the context and the subject matter of the statute. It is often
synonymous with "either", "every" or "all". Its generality may be restricted by context; (Black's Law Dictionary; Fifth Edition). Unless the legislature had intended that both classes
of tenants can be asked to vacate by the Rent Controller for providing the landlord additional accommodation be it for residential or non-residential purposes. it would not
have used the word "any" instead of using the letter "a" to denote a tenant.

5

Shanti And
Ors. vs
Bhagwani And
Ors (P & H)
AIR 1984 P H
313

Provision Interpreted-Section 109 of The Indian Succession Act, 1925—Where a bequest has been made to any child or other lineal descendant of the testator, and the
legatee dies in the lifetime of the testator, but any lineal descendant of his survives the testator, the bequest shall not lapse, but shall take effect as if the death of the
legatee had happened immediately after the death of the testator, unless a contrary intention appears by the Will.
The question before the Court was whether the words 'any child' used is Section 109 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 means "one child only" or it can mean "children"
also, as the case may be, is the main point involved in this second appeal. The Court held that it appears that the worm 'any child' includes plural also Section 109 of the Act was
specifically framed, whenever will was in favour of a child or children of the testator or in favour of other lineal descendant or descendants oil the testator.

6

Pashupati
Nath Sinha vs
State Of Bihar
1978 (26)
BLJR 849
(Pat)

Provision Interpreted- Section 13(1) in The Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973-The High Court may, if requested by the Central or State Government so to do, confer upon
any person who holds or has held any post under the Government, all or any of the powers conferred or conferrable by or under this Code on a Judicial Magistrate 1 of the
first class or of the second class, in respect to particular cases or to particular classes of cases, in any local area, not being a metropolitan area.
It was contended that High Court could appoint Special Magistrates and clothe them with all or any of the powers conferrable on a Judicial Magistrate of the Second Class in respect to
particular classes of cases or to cases generally within a district and not for the whole State and the expression "in any district" must be read as limiting the jurisdiction of the Magistrates
to be vested with said powers. It was held there was no justification for giving the word 'any' a narrow interpretation to construe that Special Magistrate could be appointed
only for one district as it would frustrate object of Act which empowers High Court to appoint Special Magistrate for particular classes of cases or to cases generally

S.No

Case

Held

1

Shri Ishar
Alloy Steels
Ltd vs
Jayaswals
Neco Limited
on 22
February,
2001-(SC)

Provision Interpreted- Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act-Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless—
(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier
The use of the words "a bank" and "the bank" in the Section is indicator of the intention of the Legislature. The former is indirect article and the latter is pre-fixed by direct
article. If the Legislature intended to have the same meanings for "a bank" and "the bank", there was no cause or occasion for mentioning it distinctly and differently by
using two different articles. It is worth noticing that the word "banker" in Section 3 of the Act is pre-fixed by the indefinite article "a" and the word "bank" where the cheque
is intended to be presented under Section 138 is pre-fixed by the definite article "the". The same Section permits a person to issue a cheuqe on an account maintained by him
with "a bank" and makes him liable for criminal prosecution if it is returned by "the bank" unpaid. The payment of the cheque is contemplated by "the bank" meaning thereby where the
person issuing the cheque has an account. "The" is the word used before nouns, with a specifying of particularising effect opposed to the indefinite or generalising force of
"a" or "an". It determines what particular thing is meant; that is, what particular thing we are to assume to be meant. "The" is always mentioned to denote particular thing
or a person.

2

Consolidated
Coffee Ltd.
and Another
vs.
Coffee
Board,
Bangalore
(SC)- 1980
SCR (3) 625

Provision Interpreted- Section 5(3) of Central Sales Tax Act, 1956-(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the last sale or purchase of any goods
preceding the sale or purchase occasioning the export of those goods out of the territory of India shall also be deemed to be in the course of such export, if such last sale
or purchase took place after, and was for the purpose of complying with, the agreement or order for or in relation to such export.
Secondly and more importantly, the user of the definite article "the" before the word "agreement" is, in our view, very significant. Parliament has not said 'an agreement'
or 'any agreement' for or in relation to such export and in the context the expression "the agreement" would refer to that agreement which is implicit in the sale occasioning
the export. Between the two sales (the penultimate and the final) spoken of in the earlier part of the sub-section ordinarily it is the final sale that would be connected with the export,
and, therefore, the expression "the agreement" for export must refer to that agreement which is implicit in the sale that occasions the export. The user of the definite article "the",
therefore, clearly suggests that the agreement spoken of must be the agreement with a foreign buyer. As a matter of pure construction it appears to us clear, therefore, that by
necessary implication the expression "the agreement" occurring in the relevant phrase means or refers to the agreement with a foreign buyer and not an agreement or any
agreement with a local party containing the covenant to export.

3

Canon India
Private
Limited
Versus
Commission
er Of
Customs
(SC) [2021]
125
taxmann.com
188 (SC)

Provision Interpreted- Section 28(4) of Customs Act-Where any duty has not been [levied or not paid or has been short levied or short-paid] or erroneously refunded, or
interest payable has not been paid, partpaid or erroneously refunded, by reason of, - (a) collusion; or (b) any wilful mis-statement; or (c) suppression of facts, by the
importer or the exporter or the agent or employee of the importer or exporter, the proper officer shall, within five years from the relevant date, serve notice on the person
chargeable with duty or interest which has not been [so levied or not paid] or which has been so short-levied or short-paid or to whom the refund has erroneously been
made, requiring him to show cause why he should not pay the amount specified in the notice.
11. Parliament has employed the article “the” not accidently but with the intention to designate the proper officer who had assessed the goods at the time of clearance. It
must be clarified that the proper officer need not be the very officer who cleared the goods but may be his successor in office or any other officer authorised to exercise
the powers within the same office. In this case, anyone authorised from the Appraisal Group.
14. As in this case, when the statute directs that “the proper officer” can determine duty not levied/not paid, it does not mean any proper officer but that proper officer alone. We find it
completely impermissible to allow an officer, who has not passed the original order of assessment, to re-open the assessment on the grounds that the duty was not paid/not levied, by
the original officer who had decided to clear the goods and who was competent and authorised to make the assessment

4

Commission
er Of IncomeTax vs T.
Veerabhadra
Rao, K.
Koteswara
(All) 1976 102
ITR 604 AP

Provision Interpreted- Section 36(2)(i) of Income Tax Act 1961-:"In making any deduction for a bad debt or part thereof, the following provisions shall apply :
(i) No such deduction shall be allowed unless such debt or part thereof--
(a) has been taken into account in computing the income of the assessee of that previous year, or of an earlier previous year, or represents money lent in the ordinary
course of the business of banking or money-lending which is carried on by the assessee, and
(b) has been written off as irrecoverable in the accounts of the assessee for that previous year."
20. ..What follows, therefore, is that if we keep the correct use of the word "the" in view, then the term "the assessee" cannot mean anything else than what we have just now said.
21. If so read, the article "the" in Clause (a) would mean the assessee into whose account the bad debt has been taken into account in computing the income of the previous
year or the assessee who had lent the bad debt money in the ordinary course of business of banking or money-lending. And for Clause (b) it would mean the assessee in
whose account such a bad debt has been written off as irrecoverable. More than this, the use of the article would not mean anything more nor is it intended to be read in
any other meaning. It, therefore, follows that merely because the article "the" is used in Clause (b) it would not necessarily mean that the two assessees for the purposes of Clauses
(a) and (b) must be one and the same assessee

S.No

Case

Held

1

Falcon Tyres v.
State of Karnataka
[2006] 5 STT 67
(SC)

Provision Interpreted- Section 2(A)(1):agricultural produce or horticultural produce' shall not include tea, coffee, rubber, cashew, cardamom, pepper and cotton; and
such produce as has been subjected to any physical, chemical or other process for being made fit for consumption, save mere cleaning, grading, sorting or drying.
We do not find any substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the semicolon after the word cotton does not mean that the first part of
the Section is disjunctive from 'such produce' as has been subjected to any physical, chemical or other process. Section 2 (A) (1) is in two parts, it excludes two types of
food from agricultural produce. According to us, the definition of the agriculture and horticulture produce does not say as to what would be included in the agriculture or horticulture
produce, in substance it includes all agriculture or horticulture produce but excludes, (1) tea, coffee, rubber, cashew, cardamom, pepper and cotton from the definition of the
agriculture or horticulture produce though all these products as per dictionary meaning or in common parlance would be understood as agricultural produce and (2) "such produce
as has been subject to any physical, chemical or other process for being made fit for consumption", meaning thereby that the agricultural produce other than what has been
excluded, which has been subjected to any physical, chemical or other process for making it fit for consumption would also be excluded from the definition of the agriculture or
horticulture produce except where such agricultural produce is merely cleaned, graded, sorted or dried

2

Vadilal Dairy
International Ltd. v.
State of
Maharashtra [2015]
61 taxmann.com 37
(Bombay)

Provision Interpreted- (1) Sweets and sweetmeats, including Shrikhand, Basundi and Doodhpak; Cakes, pastries, biscuits and other confectioneries, ice cream and
kulfi and non-alcoholic drinks containing ice cream or kulfi.
The use of semicolon after the words "doodhpak" is significant. It separates first category from the other category which includes items like cakes, pastries, biscuits
and other confectioneries. These items form the second category. A plain reading of the items in the second category makes it quite clear that all these are items connected
and commonly sold in bakery establishments. The third category contains the item in dispute namely ice cream along with kulfi and non-alcoholic drinks containing ice-creams or
kulfi. The third category therefore, is quite distinct and different from the first two categories of this entry.

3

Jamshed N.
Guzdar v. State of
Maharashtra [2005]
2 SCC 591 (SC)

Provision Interpreted- 11A. Administration of Justice; constitution and organisation of all courts, except the Supreme Court and the High Courts.
The expression 'administration of justice' has been used without any qualification or limitation wide enough to include the 'powers' and 'jurisdiction' of all the courts except the
Supreme Court. The semicolon (;) after the words 'administration of justice' in Entry 11A has significance and meaning. The other words in the same Entry after
'administration of justice' only speak in relation to 'constitution' and 'organisation' of all the courts except the Supreme Court and High Courts. It follows that under
Entry 11A State Legislature has no power to constitute and organize Supreme Court and High Courts

4

CC, Madras Vs.
Mcdowell Co. Ltd.,
1997 (21) RLT 715
(CEGAT)

Provision Interpreted-84.79 Goods falling under sub-heading Nos. 8479.20, 8479.30, 8479.40; sub-heading No. 8479.81 excluding wire coil winders; and machinery
used for the production of a commodity.
We however, note that while sub¬heading 8479.82 is not included the relevant entry after enumerating various sub-headings lists machinery used for the production of a commodity
also as eligible to exemption. The expression "and machinery used for the production of a commodity" occurs after a semi-colon which clearly indicates that this is a
distinct category of goods which the Notification intended to exempt. Non-inclusion of specific Heading 8479.82 under these circumstances would not disentitle the impugned
goods from exemption provided, of course, the impugned goods are held to be machinery used for the production of a commodity

5

Mahindra &
Mahindra Ltd. v.
Commissioner of
Central Excise,
Aurangabad [1997]
1997 taxmann.com
861 (CEGAT Mum)

Provision Interpreted- No credit shall be allowed in respect of a factory from which clearances of the specified goods
(a) were effected for the first time on or after the 1st day of April, 1981; or
(b) were not effected during the financial years 1981-82, 1982-83 and 1983-84.
One category is where clearances of the specified goods were effected for the first time on or after 1.4.81. The second category is one from which no clearances of specified goods
had been effected during the financial year 1981-82, 1982-83 and 1983-84. In such a view of the matter, the semicolon punctuating the two conditions, and use of the
disjunctive "OR" between the conditions, acquires meaning. Hence, when the appellants had cleared motor vehicles falling under item 34I (2) CET for the first time
only in July, 1981, they fall under the first category, and claim has rightly been held to be hit by the provision of B iv (a) of the notification 116/84

6

Jindal Stainless
Ltd. v. State of
Haryana [2016] 75
taxmann.com 137
(SC)

Provision Interpreted- Article 304 of Constitution of India-Notwithstanding anything in Article 301 or Article 303, the Legislature of a State may by law
(a) impose on goods imported from other States or the Union territories any tax to which similar goods manufactured or produced in that State are subject, so,
however, as not to discriminate between goods so imported and goods so manufactured or produced; and
(b) impose such reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse with or within that State as may be required in the public interest: Provided
that no Bill or amendment for the purposes of clause shall be introduced or moved in the Legislature of a State without the previous sanction of the President.
The Supreme Court held that applying the ratio in the above decisions since the expression 'and' is used in Art. 304 after semi-colon, it will have to be read as 'or'
creating a disjunctive reading of Art. 304(a) and Art. 304(b) indicating that the State Legislature can exercise its power either under Art.304 (a) or Art. 304 (b) or both

S.No

Case

Held

1

Commissioner Of Income
Tax vs M/S. Cello Plast
(Bom HC)

The statue viz. Section 54EC of the Act provides for exemption from tax to long term capital gain provided the same is invested in bonds of Rural Electrification
Corporation Limited or National Highway Authority of India. However, as the bonds were not available, it was impossible for the respondent-assessee to invest
in them within six months of the sale of their factory building.

2

Cochin State Power And
Light vs State Of Kerala1965 AIR 1688, 1965
SCR (3) 187

Section 6 came into force on September 5, 1959, and the relevant period expired on December 3. 1960. In the circumstances, the giving of the requisite notice of 18 months
in respect of the option of purchase on the expiry of December 2, 1960, was impossible from the very commencement of s.6. The performance of this impossible duty
must be excused in accordance with the maxim, lex non cogitate ad impossible (the law does not compel the doing of impossibilities), and sub-s(4) of s.6 must
be construed as not being applicable to a case where compliance with it is impossible.

3

The Inter College,
Through Its ... vs The
State Of U.P. (All HC)

If the authorities for their own default sit tight and idle, did not bother for making the forms available to the institutions, is it permissible subsequently to the authorities to
require the college and the students to adhere to the time schedule prescribed in the regulation and else face consequences. In our view the answer would be 'No' since
neither the said provision can be read in such manner nor Regulations permit such interpretation. "Lex Non Cogit ad impossibilia." The law does not compel a man to
do that which he cannot possibly perform and if duty is created and party is disable to perform without any default in him and has no remedy, law will excuse

4

Commissioner of
Customs, ICD, TKD, New
Delhi v. J.S. Gujral 2009
taxmann.com 347 (Delhi)

The Tribunal placed reliance on the maxim lex non cogitad impossibilia which means that the law cannot ask a person to do the impossible. We agree with these observations
and views of the Tribunal. As per the Import Policy the importers were required to obtain the Type Approval Certificate/COP from the international accredited
agency of the country of origin of the goods. In this case the cars have been imported from Japan and, therefore, it was only the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure
and Transport which could have issued the Type Approval Certificate/COP. The respondents had applied to the said Ministry for the Type Approval
Certificates/COPs but the Ministry had flatly refused in so many words. In such a situation the respondents could not be expected to submit the Type Approval
Certificate/COP from the said agency. We are, therefore, not inclined to interfere with the impugned order passed by the Tribunal.

5

Sembcorp Energy India
Ltd. v. State of Andhra
Pradesh [2022] 142
taxmann.com 400
(Andhra Pradesh)

Petitioner contended that in so far as transmission of electricity is concerned, it is impossible to generate shipping bills, as supply from one place to another place and from
one country to another country is only through transmission lines. Thus, shipping bill is a custom document and the same cannot be made applicable to show supply of
electricity; which is intangible in nature. High Court observed situation reminded them of an age old maxim 'Lex Non Cogit ad impossibilia', meaning that law does
not compel a man to do things which he cannot possibly perform and held that petitioner was justified in not producing shipping bills to prove the quantity of
energy units transmitted and that the reports of REA filed by the petitioner, could be made the basis to deal with the claim for refund of Input Tax Credit.

6

I.F.C.I. Ltd. v. Cannanore
Spinning and Weaving
Mills Ltd, AIR 2002 SC
1841

We also would like to add that whenever there is any beneficial legislation or any scheme giving certain benefit to anyone, the scheme should be interpreted so as to make
its objective more effective and not in a manner which would frustrate the objective. In the instant case, the State wanted generation of additional electricity and under
the scheme, the said task had been partly taken over by the petitioner and in fact the petitioner generated electricity as long as it was in a position to do so. The
scheme, being framed not only for the benefit of the State but also for the entities like the petitioner, it ought to have been interpreted in a liberal manner.'

7

Rolcon Engg. Co. Ltd. v.
State of Gujarat [2009] 21
VST 118 (Guj.)

The benefits given to the petitioner under the tax incentive scheme for wind power generation were sought to be withdrawn on the ground that the petitioner had committed
breach of clause 7(f) of the Gujarat Sales Incentive Scheme for Wind Power Generation, 1993 by not by not keeping the wind farm/windmills in operation for a continuous
period of six years after commissioning them. In the said case, it was the case on behalf of the petitioner that due to cyclone in the coastal area windmills which were already
installed, came to be destroyed. It was only on account of act of God that the petitioner industrial undertaking could not keep the wind-farm running for a continuous period
of six years in commissioning them and therefore, it was not possible for the petitioner to comply with clause 7(f) of the Gujarat Sales Tax Incentive Scheme for Wind Power
Generation, 1993. It was held that if it appears that the performance of the formalities prescribed by a statute had been rendered impossible by circumstances
over which the person interested had no control, those circumstances would be taken as a valid excuse.

8

State of Gujarat v. S.A.
Himnani Distributors (P.)
Ltd [2014] 43
taxmann.com 358
(Gujarat)

Under the circumstances, when it was impossible for the dealer to comply with all the conditions stipulated for input tax credit due to act of God and it was
beyond control of the respondent-dealer to fulfil conditions for availment of the input tax credit due to the act of God - in the present case, the flood, which can
be said to be valid excuse for not fulfilling the conditions stipulated for availing input tax credit on the goods destroyed in flood and therefore, interpreting the
provisions for availing input tax credit, it is hereby held that the dealer shall be entitled to input tax credit on the goods destroyed in flood. However, subject to rider that if
such dealer is compensated by the Insurance Company with respect to loss sustained i.e. with respect to the goods destroyed, the same can be given credit, meaning
thereby, to that extent the respondent - dealer shall not be entitled to input tax credit, otherwise, it will be giving a double benefit to the respondent - dealer

S.No

Case Subject

Case

Held

1

Calculation of time limit
“within a specified
period”

Haru Das Gupta vs State
Of West Bengal-(SC) 1972
AIR 1293, 1972 SCR (3)
329

The day on which the cause of action arose, is to be excluded from computation and the day on which such action is taken is to be included.
Therefore, in computing the period of three months from the date of detention, which was February 5, 1971, before the expiration of
which the order or decision for confirming the detention order and continuation of the detention thereunder had to be made, the date
of the commencement of detention, namely, February 5, 1971, has to be excluded. So done, the order of confirmation was made before
the expiration of the period of three months from the date of detention.

2

Calculation of the Time
limit having words “not
less than”

Commissioner Of
Income-Tax vs Ekbal And
Co. (Bom) (1945) 47
BOMLR 181 (Bom HC)

The expression "within thirty days" and "not less than thirty days" are two quite different things. "Within thirty days" is within two points of
time, one at which the period begins and the other at which it expires. On the other hand, "not less than thirty days" is outside these
two points of time. There must be an interval of not less than thirty days and that means thirty days clear.

3

Calculation of Time
limit using “not earlier
than”

Jai Charan Lal vs State Of
U.P. & Ors (SC) 1968 AIR,
5

The expression "not earlier than thirty days" is not to be equated to the expression, not less than thirty days". It is no doubt true that where the
expression is "not less than so many days" both the terminal days have to be excluded and the number of days mentioned must be clear days
but the force of the words "not earlier than thirty days" is not the same. " In other words, although October 26 had to be excluded the date
on which the meeting was to be called need not be excluded provided by doing so one did not go in breach of the expression "not
earlier than thirty days.". The 25th of November was the 30th day counting from October 26 leaving out the initial day and therefore it
cannot be described as earlier than thirty days

4

Meaning of the words
“For the time being”-

Union Territory Of
Chandigarh And ... vs
Rajesh Kumar Basandhi
And Anr (SC)

The meaning of the phrase understood in general sense is that such an expression is indefinite in time and refers to state of facts
which may arise and exist at the time rule is applied which may vary at different times. The same meaning as generally understood also
had the approval in (1992) 3 Supreme Court Cases 576 -Jivendra Nath Kaul v. Collector/District Magistrate and Anr wherein it was held that "For
the time being" means at the moment or existing position

5

Meaning of “at any
time”

Ibrahimpatnam Taluk
Vyavasaya ... vs K.Suresh
Reddy & Ors (SC)

The exercise of suo-motu power "at any time" only means that no specific period such as days, months or years are not prescribed reckoning
from a particular date. But that does not mean that "at any time" should be unguided and arbitrary. In this view, "at any time" must be
understood as within a reasonable time depending on the facts and circumstances of each case in the absence of prescribed period
of limitation

6

Meaning of the Words
“Reasonable Time”

Veerayee Ammal v. Seeni
Ammal, [2002] 1 SCC 134

The expression means a reasonable time, looking at all the circumstances of the case; a reasonable time under ordinary circumstances;
as soon as circumstances will permit; so much time as is necessary under the circumstances, conveniently to do what the contract
requires should be done; some more protracted space than "directly" such length of time as may fairly, and properly, and reasonably
be allowed or required, having regard to the nature of the act or duty and to attending circumstances; all convey more or less same idea

7

Meaning of phrase “as
soon as”

Abdul Jabar Butt vs State
Of Jammu & Kashmir-
(SC) 1957 AIR 281

The question is- what is the span of time, which is designated by the words " as soon as may be'? The observations of Dysant, J., in King's Old
Country, Ltd. v. Liquid Carbonic Can. Corpn., Ltd. (1), quoted in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 3rd edition, vol. 1 page 200, are apposite. Said the
learned Judge, " to do a thing I as soon as possible means to do it within a reasonable time, with an understanding to do it within the shortest
possible time." Likewise to communicate the grounds 'as soon as may be' may well be said to mean to do so within a reasonable time
with an understanding to do it within the shortest possible time

8

Meaning of the Word
“Forthwith

Keshav Nilkanth Joglekar
vs The Commissioner Of
Police,: AIR 1957 SC 28

The Term "forthwith" in section 3(3), cannot mean the same thing as "as soon as may be" in section 7, and that the former is more
peremptory than the latter. The difference between the two expression lies, in our opinion, in this that while under section 7 the time
that is allowed to the authority to send the communication to the detenu is what is reasonably convenient, under section 3(3) what is
allowed is only the period during which he could not, without any fault of his own, send the report. Under section 7 the question is
whether the time taken for communicating the grounds is reasonably requisite. Under section 3(3) it is whether the report has been sent at the
earliest point of time possible, and when there is an interval of time between the date of the order and the date of the report, what has to be
considered is whether the delay in sending the report could have been avoided

S.No

Section

Case Subject

Case

Held

1

Section 73
and Section
74

Appellate PreDeposit to be allowed
to be paid by Debit to
Credit Ledger

Larsen & Toubro
Ltd. v. Joint
Commissioner
(ST) [2023] 154
taxmann.com 81
(Madras)

The High Court directed the revenue to number the appeal by permitting the petitioner to debit the amounts that are lying unutilized in
the petitioner's Electronic Credit Ledger towards pre-deposit under Section 107(6) of the Tamil Nadu Goods and Services Tax Act,
2017 and dispose the same on merits and in accordance with law in its turn

2

Section 73
and Section
74

Petitioner directed to
file Appeal before
Appellate Authority
and Appellate
Authority directed to
get goods tested on
application by
petitioner

Larsen & Toubro
Ltd. v. Joint
Commissioner
(ST) [2023] 154
taxmann.com 81
(Madras)

The goods which were subject matter of dispute were Cut Tobacco or Manufactured Tobacco and department had confirmed demand without
subjecting product to testing. At the stage of admission, the Court, by its order had directed drawing of sample for being taken for testing
before the Authority. However, the report was not available.
High Court observed that since petitioner had filed the Writ Petition within limitation prescribed for filing an appeal under section 107 thus,
the writ petition was disposed of by giving opportunity to the petitioner to file a statutory appeal before the Appellate Authority under section
107. The Appellate Authority was also directed that if the appeal is filed by the petitioner within the time stipulated, he shall consider
the appeal and the petitioner was entitled to have a sample tested before the Authority and make an application before the Appellate
Authority to send a sample for testing before the Testing Authority.

3

Section 74

Date on which SCN
was issued, there
was no allegation of
fraud or
misrepresentation on
the part of petitioner
and opportunity of
hearing not provided

Santosh Traders
v. State of U.P.
[2023] 154
taxmann.com 86
(Allahabad)

Notice was issued under Section 74 and date by which reply was to be submitted was fixed as 12-3-2021, however no date or time of personal
hearing was specified in the notice. The petitioner appeared on 18-3-2021 and sought further time to file the reply. Thereafter, without passing
any order on the said application, the order came to be passed on 14-7-2021, whereby demand as proposed in the show cause notice was
confirmed against the petitioner. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the said order, the same was delayed and was dismissed.
High Court held observed that the date on which show cause notice was issued, there was no allegation of fraud or mis-presentation
on the part of petitioner and there was no mention as to how the case would fall under section 74. No opportunity of personal
hearing admittedly was granted to the petitioner which was required in terms of Section 75(4) even if the petitioner had not filed
his reply to the show cause notice. The order passed was thus held contrary to mandate of Section 75 and thus was quashed.
Cases Referred- Bharat Mint And Allied Chemicals v. Commissioner Commercial Tax And 2 Others

4

Section 75

Opportunity of being
heard to be provided
whether reply filed or
not

Party Time
Hospitality v.
State of U.P.
[2023] 154
taxmann.com 85
(Allahabad)

High Court observed that from the order of assessment passed in pursuance to SCN issued under section 74 of GST Act, admittedly, no
hearing was accorded to the petitioner, which was contrary to the mandate of law prescribed under section 75(4); as an
expropriatory action, even otherwise, the principles of natural justice had to be complied with and it was incumbent to grant an
opportunity of hearing irrespective whether a reply was filed or not in terms of the mandate of Section 75(4) of GST Act.
Cases Referred-M/s Mohini Traders v. State of U.P. & Anr.; Writ Tax No. 550 of 2023 decided on 3-5-2023; M/s Lari Almirah House v. State
of U.P. & Ors.; Writ Tax No. 1569 of 2022 decided on 12-4-2023; Bharat Mint & Allied Chemicals v. Commissioner of Commercial Tax.; Writ
Tax No. 1029 of 2021 decided on 4-3-2022

5

Section 75

Mandatory to afford
opportunity before
passing an adverse
order, even though
petitioner may have
signified 'No' in
column meant to
mark choice to avail
personal hearing

Dana Pani v.
State of U.P.
[2023] 154
taxmann.com 84
(Allahabad

High Court observed by referring to Section 75(4), that once it has been laid down by way of a principle of law that a person is not required
to request for "opportunity of personal hearing" and it remained mandatory upon Assessing Authority to afford such opportunity before
passing an adverse order, the fact that petitioner may have signified 'No' in the column meant to mark the assessee's choice to
avail personal hearing, would bear no legal consequence. Even otherwise in an assessment order creating heavy civil liability, observing
such minimal opportunity of hearing is a must. Such opportunity has to be granted in real terms. The stand of the assessee may remain
unclear unless opportunity is first granted. Only thereafter, explanation furnished may be rejected and demand created. This opportunity
would ensure observance of rules of natural of justice but it would allow authority to pass appropriate and reasoned order as may serve
interest of justice and allow a better appreciation to arise at next/appeal stage, if required.
Cases Referred- Bharat Mint & Allied Chemicals v. Commissioner Commerical Tax & 2 Ors., (2022) 48 VLJ 325